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1	Sensory	Substitution	and	Augmentation:	An	Introduction	
Fiona	Macpherson	
	
1.1	What	are	sensory	substitution	and	sensory	augmentation?	
The	senses	are	our	windows	on	the	world.	They	constitute	the	various	ways	that	
we	have	of	perceiving	the	world.	Vision,	hearing,	touch,	taste,	smell,	
proprioception,	and	balance,	among	others,	are	the	ways	that	we	humans,	and	
other	creatures,	have	of	gaining	empirical	knowledge	about	the	world.	
Losing	a	sense	is	a	terrifying	prospect.	Becoming	blind	or	deaf,	losing	the	
sense	of	touch	or	taste,	or	any	of	the	other	senses,	would	cut	oneself	off	from	
important	and	valuable	features	of	world.	The	loss	of	certain	experiences	would	
itself	be	hard	to	come	to	terms	with	and,	practically	speaking,	many	important	
activities	would	become	more	difficult:	negotiating	one’s	way	around	the	world,	
communicating	with	other	people,	and	avoiding	danger.	Even	the	prospect	of	
losing	one’s	sense	of	smell,	the	sense	that	most	people	might	chose	to	lose,	if	
forced	to	chose	to	lose	one	of	them,	has	been	shown	often	to	have	dire	
consequences.	Unlike	the	loss	of	other	senses,	which	typically	lead	to	temporary	
depression	followed	by	a	period	of	readjustment,	the	loss	of	smell	can	often	lead	
to	lasting	depression.1	Lack	of	enjoyment	of	food,	inability	to	monitor	one’s	body	
odour,	increased	social	anxiety,	impaired	sex-life,	and	the	loss	of	the	strong	
connection	between	smell	and	the	emotions,	are	among	the	effects	of	losing	this	
sense.	The	prospect,	therefore,	of	being	able	to	replace	vision,	hearing,	smell,	or	
any	other	sense,	in	full	or	in	part,	by	exploiting	another	sense	or	senses,	is	an	
immensely	attractive	prospect	for	some—a	prospect	that	potentially	could	
transform	for	the	better	the	lives	of	those	who	have	lost	a	sense.	This	is	the	
prospect	of	sensory	substitution.	
For	those	who	have	been	born	without	a	sense,	or	lost	a	sense	very	early	
in	life,	rather	than	late	in	life,	the	issue	of	whether	one	should	provide,	or	try	to	
provide,	the	missing	sense	is	a	complicated	one.	For	example,	some	people	in	the	
Deaf	community	see	themselves	as	being	differently	abled	compared	to	those	
people	born	with	hearing,	and	not	as	people	that	are	impoverished	and	need	to	
be	‘cured’.	While	people	who	are	deaf	lack	access	to	sound,	they	have	access	to	
something	that	hearing	people	typically	do	not:	the	rich	and	distinctive	Deaf	
language	and	culture.	They	are	keen	to	preserve	this	and	they	would	not	want	
this	to	be	lost	by	giving	a	sense	of	hearing	to	all	deaf	people.2	Nonetheless,	some	
people	who	have	been	born	without	a	sense,	or	who	have	lost	one	very	early	in	
life,	would	like	to	be	able	to	have	that	sense—or	at	least	the	possibility	of	
discovering	whether	they	would	prefer	a	life	that	included	having	that	sense.	In	
the	case	of	blind	people,	for	example,	the	potential	to	be	less	reliant	on	other	
																																																								
1	See	Deems	et	al.	(1991),	Gudziol	et	al.	(2009),	and	Seo	et	al.	(2009).	
2	See	Hyde	and	Power	(2006).	
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people	sometimes	provides	a	large	motivating	factor	to	gain	sight.	And	so,	at	
least	for	some	people	born	without	one	of	the	human	senses,	or	who	lost	one	
early,	the	possibility	of	gaining	such	a	sense	is	a	highly	attractive	prospect,	in	
addition	to	it	being	an	immensely	attractive	prospect	for	those	who	lose	a	sense	
later	in	life.	
While	the	prospect	of	being	able	to	replace	a	sense	is	potentially	
transformative	for	those	who	have	lost	a	sense,	it	also	gives	rise	to	new	and	
rather	exciting	ideas.	If	replacing	a	sense	is	possible,	then	could	we	extend	our	
existing	senses,	or	could	we	give	ourselves	whole	new	senses?	Who	hasn’t	
thought	that	it	would	be	interesting	to	be	able	to	hear	or	smell	the	range	of	
stimuli	that	we	know	that	dogs	can	and	that	humans,	at	least	without	
augmentation,	cannot?	What	schoolchild	hasn’t	thought	that	having	X-ray	vision	
might	be	fun?	Perhaps	having	an	extended	sense	or	having	a	new	sense	could	be	
useful	in	some	circumstances.	When	one	hears	about	the	senses	that	some	
nonhuman	animals	have—such	as	electric	senses	or	magnetic	senses,	senses	that	
open	up	whole	new	possibilities	for	finding	out	about	the	world,	navigating	
through	it,	and	acting	upon	it—who	wouldn’t	want	to	acquire	such	senses,	even	
if	only	on	a	temporary	basis?	Sensory	augmentation	devices	try	to	deliver	these	
possibilities.3	
We	can	state	more	formally	what	sensory	substitution	and	sensory	
augmentation	amount	to.	In	sensory	substitution,	one	tries	to	replace	a	missing	
sense	by	delivering	some	or	all	of	the	information	usually	gathered	by	one	sense	
to	another	sense.	What	counts	as	a	missing	sense	in	a	person	in	this	context	is	
determined	by	considering	the	normal	sensory	capacities	of	humans.	More	
generally,	what	counts	as	a	missing	sense	in	a	creature	is	determined	by	
considering	the	normal	sensory	capacities	of	the	species	of	which	the	creature	is	
a	member.	Sensory	substitution	has	been	attempted	using	modern	technology	
since	the	1960s,	although,	arguably,	other	more	low-tech	means	have	been	
around	for	a	lot	longer.	For	example,	the	use	of	Braille	is	a	way	to	get	information	
about	words	on	a	page	to	those	who	are	blind	by	exploiting	their	sense	of	touch.	
Likewise,	the	use	of	a	cane	by	blind	people	is	a	way	of	using	touch	to	get	
information	about	obstacles	in	the	world—obstacles	that	would	typically	be	
detected	by	sight	by	those	that	have	it.	Bach-y-Rita	and	Kercel	(2003)	suggest	
that	writing	itself	may	be	considered	the	first	sensory	substitution	device	as	it	is	
a	way	of	presenting	information	about	words	to	vision—information	that	before	
the	invention	of	writing	was	gained	through	hearing	the	spoken	word.	The	
promise	of	modern	technology	is	to	provide	powerful	tools	to	replace	missing	
senses—ideally,	at	least,	to	replace	a	missing	sense	in	toto,	although	whether	that	
is	possible	is	as	yet	unknown.	The	goal	that	falls	short	of	the	ideal	is	to	provide	as	
much	useful	information	as	possible—information	that	one	normally	gets	
through	a	missing	sense—by	means	of	another	sense.	
An	extension	of	this	idea	yields	sensory	augmentation.	Rather	than	
replace	a	missing	sense	with	another,	one	tries	to	create	a	novel	sense	or	
																																																								
3	Some	philosophers,	such	as	Nudds	(2004)	and	Richardson	(2013)	have,	in	line	with	Aristotle,	
argued	that	there	are	only	five	senses.	I	reject	this	view	and	argue	against	it	in	Macpherson	
(2011a)	and	(2013).	
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enhance	an	existing	sense.	To	do	this,	one	has	to	do	that	which	one	does	in	
sensory	substitution:	deliver	information	to	a	subject	via	a	sense	that	does	not	
usually	deliver	that	information.	This	is	why	sensory	substitution	and	
augmentation	are	closely	related.	As	we	increasingly	learn	of	the	senses	of	
nonhumans	animals,	so	the	intriguing	possibilities	of	senses	we	can	imagine	
giving	people	grows.4	Among	others,	we	can	imagine	having	a	magnetic	sense	
that	allows	us	to	detect	magnetic	fields	and	their	properties,	as	pigeons	do	and	
use	to	navigate	long	distances;	and	we	can	envisage	having	an	electric	sense	
enabling	us	to	detect	electric	fields,	as	many	fish	have;	or	we	can	contemplate	
having	echolocation,	as,	for	example,	bats	have.	It	might	also	be	possible	to	make	
our	senses	more	sensitive	and	thus,	for	example,	responsive	to	higher	or	lower	
sounds,	more	and	more	diffuse	smells,	larger	and	smaller	frequencies	of	
electromagnetic	radiation,	and	so	on.	Possessing	such	senses	might	allow	us	to	
help	ourselves,	and	each	other,	in	ways	that	we	could	not	before.	For	example,	
having	the	ability	to	detect	objects	in	front	of	us	in	the	dark—an	ability	that	
echolocation	confers—might	help	us	in	various	rescue	situations,	as	might	a	
keener	sense	of	hearing	or	smell	than	that	which	we	typically	have.		
In	addition	to	their	potential	to	increase	the	sensory	abilities	of	people,	
sensory	substitution	and	augmentation	devices	might	also	deliver	enriched	
experiences	to	people	in	virtual	reality	computer	simulated	worlds—and	in	a	
way	that	could	be	delivered	over	the	internet.	It	is	very	easy	to	transmit	images	
and	sounds	to	people	via	screens	and	speakers	using	the	internet	giving	them	
visual	and	auditory	experiences	of	a	virtual	world.	By	using	vibromotors	placed	
on	a	person’s	body	we	can	also	give	them	experiences	of	touch	corresponding	to	
a	virtual	world.	But	what	about	experiences	in	other	sensory	modalities?	That	is	
not	so	easy.	But	sensory	substitution	and	augmentation	might	be	able	to	help.	
Sensory	substitution	might	allow	us	to	get	information	to	a	person	that	they	
would	normally	get	from	modalities	other	than	sight,	hearing	and	touch	via	those	
modalities—modalities	that	it	is	easy	to	send	information	to	over	the	internet.	If	
that	is	right	then	we	might	be	able	to	enrich	people’s	online	virtual	experience.	
For	example,	devices	have	been	created	that	use	tactile	stimulation	on	the	tongue	
to	give	people	information	about	their	position	with	respect	to	gravity—in	other	
words	information	about	their	balance—that	they	would	normally	get	through	
their	vestibular	sense.5	Using	such	a	device,	one	could	send	information	about	a	
person’s	orientation	to	gravity	corresponding	to	the	position	that	a	person	is	in	
in	a	virtual	world.	This	is	just	one	example	of	many	possibilities	that	sensory	
substitution	and	augmentation	may	open	up.	
In	conclusion,	it	is	hoped	that	modern	sensory	substitution	and	
augmentation	devices	will	be	able	to	replace	or	expand	our	senses.	But	to	what	
extent	has	this	been	achieved	to	date?	To	what	extent	are	the	experiences	
created	by	sensory	substitution	devices	like	the	sensory	experiences	that	we	are	
trying	to	replace?	To	what	extent	can	we	augment	people’s	senses	providing	
them	with	new	information	and	new	experiences?	The	first	aim	of	this	
introduction	is	to	delve	deeply	into	this	question	to	discover	the	usefulness	of	
these	devices,	to	outline	the	different	sorts	of	experience	that	might	be	created,	
																																																								
4	See,	for	example,	Hughes	(2001).	
5	See	Tyler	et	al.	(2003).	
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and	what	the	evidence	tells	us	about	these	experiences.	While	there	are	some	
reasons	to	be	hopeful	about	the	powers	of	sensory	substitution	devices,	there	are	
also	reasons	to	wonder	whether	they	will	ever	really	have	the	practical	
applications	that	we	hope	they	might	have.	The	second	aim	is	to	look	to	see	
whether	the	study	of	modern	sensory	substitution	and	augmentation	devices	can	
shed	light	on	the	nature	of	our	senses	and	perception	in	general.	Much	of	the	
philosophical,	psychological,	and	neuroscientific	work	that	takes	place	
concerning	sensory	substitution	and	augmentation	is	keenly	aware	of	the	
possibility	that	it	might	help	our	understanding	and	it	seeks	to	comprehend	
many	different	aspects	of	perception.	
In	the	sections	that	follow,	I	outline	the	main	questions	and	the	debates	about	
sensory	substitution	and	augmentation	devices	that	have	arisen	in	the	literature	
to	date.	In	section	two,	I	will	describe	the	two	most	studied	modern	sensory	
substitution	devices	and	one	sensory	augmentation	device.	This	is	vital	to	allow	
the	reader	to	have	a	clear	idea	of	what	sensory	substitution	and	augmentation	
devices	are,	how	subjects’	behaviour	changes	when	they	use	them,	and	what	
subjects	say	about	their	experience.	This	forms	part	of	the	evidence	that	is	used	
to	assess	how	these	devices	work.	In	section	three,	I	will	discuss	whether	use	of	
these	devices	gives	rise	to	new	sensory	experiences	of	objects	or	just	new	
judgments	about	objects.	In	section	four,	on	the	assumption	that	new	sensory	
experiences	are	being	had,	I	will	consider	what	sensory	modality	is	operative—
the	substituted	or	the	substituting	one,	or	another	altogether.	I	will	examine	the	
evidence	concerning	whether	the	experiences	had	in	sensory	substitution	are	of	
a	two-	or	a	three-dimensional	world.	And	I	will	also	examine	the	evidence	about	
the	nature	of	those	experiences	with	respect	to	whether	colour	is	represented	in	
them.	In	section	five,	I	will	consider	whether	there	are	any	limits	to	what	
information	or	what	experiences	can	be	given	via	sensory	substitution.	In	section	
six	I	will	discuss	whether	the	results	from	sensory	substitution	experiments	can	
be	used	to	support	certain	theories	of	perception	at	the	expense	of	rivals,	and	to	
provide	illuminating	examples	of	distinctions	that	some	people	want	to	make	in	
articulating	a	theory	of	perception.	In	section	seven,	the	practical	use	of	sensory	
substitution	and	augmentation	devices	will	be	considered.	Finally,	in	section	
eight,	I	will	provide	a	brief	overview	of	the	rest	of	the	papers	that	this	volume	
contains	and	the	host	of	further	interesting	issues	that	the	authors	consider	and	
address.	
	
1.2	Sensory	Substitution	and	Augmentation	Devices	
The	most	famous	sensory	substitution	device	is	the	Tactile	Visual	Sensory	
Substitution	(TVSS)	device,	which	was	developed	by	Paul	Bach-y-Rita,	initially	
with	the	help	of	Carter	Collins	(Bach-y-Rita	(1969)).	The	device	tries	to	replace	
vision	by	exploiting	the	sense	of	touch.	Subjects	who	use	the	TVSS	are	either	
blind	people	or	sighted	people	who	are	blindfolded.	The	original	equipment	
consisted	of	a	dentist’s	chair	adapted	so	that	on	the	back	of	the	chair	was	a	grid	
of	solenoid	vibrators—in	other	words	a	grid	of	metal	pins	each	of	which	is	able	
to	vibrate.	A	camera	was	mounted	on	the	side	of	the	dentist’s	chair	that	produced	
a	black	and	white	image.	This	image	determined	which	of	the	solenoids	vibrated.	
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If	one	imagines	the	black	and	white	image	overlaid	on	top	of	the	grid	of	solenoids,	
those	solenoids	that	would	vibrate	would	be	those	whose	locus	was	within	a	
white	region	of	the	image.	For	example,	if	the	image	consisted	of	black	on	the	
left-hand	side	and	white	on	the	right-hand	side	then	the	solenoids	on	the	right-
hand	side	of	the	grid	would	vibrate	and	those	on	the	left	would	not.	If	the	image	
consisted	of	a	white	circular	area	in	the	middle	of	a	black	background,	then	a	
circle	of	solenoids	in	the	middle	of	the	grid	would	vibrate	and	the	rest	would	not.	
More	complicated	patterns	could	be	produced,	limited	only	by	the	resolution	of	
the	camera	image,	the	resolution	of	the	grid	of	solenoids,	and	the	resolution	of	
the	skin	in	being	able	to	detect	them.	
Later,	portable	versions	of	the	device	were	created	in	which	a	grid	of	
vibrating	pins	was	strapped	to	a	subject’s	back	or	stomach,	and	the	camera	was	
mounted	on	the	subject’s	forehead.	Later	still,	a	version	was	created	that,	instead	
of	using	vibrating	solenoids	on	the	skin,	used	a	grid	of	electrodes	that	could	carry	
an	electrical	charge	(rather	than	vibrate)	and	which	were	placed	into	the	mouth	
to	rest	against	the	tongue	(Bach-y-Rita	et	al.	(2003)).	This	device	is	called	a	
tongue	display	unit	(TDU).	
One	reason	for	using	the	TDU	is	that	the	tongue	is	very	sensitive	to	touch.	
Different	parts	of	the	body	are	more	or	less	sensitive	to	touch.	One	way	that	this	
is	measured	is	by	a	two-point	discrimination	test,	in	which	a	series	of	either	one	
or	two	pinpoints	is	placed	on	subjects’	skin	and	the	subjects	have	to	report	
whether	they	felt	one	or	two	pinpoints	pressing	against	them.	(The	test	is	carried	
out	with	the	eyes	closed.)	The	smallest	distance	between	two	pinpoints	that	a	
subject	can	reliably	identify	through	touch	as	being	two	pinpoints,	rather	than	
one,	is	the	subject’s	two-point	threshold.	In	normal	subjects,	the	two-point	
threshold	of	the	back	and	the	stomach	is	rather	large.	For	example,	on	the	back	it	
is	between	36	to	75mm.	The	fingertips	are	very	sensitive	and	have	a	two-point	
threshold	of	2	-	4	mm.	The	tongue	is	even	more	sensitive	at	around	1mm.6	Given	
that	we	normally	want	the	hands	to	be	free	to	carry	out	tasks,	one	can	appreciate	
why	the	tongue	is	used.	It	allows	for	a	higher	resolution	of	image	to	be	given	to	a	
subject,	compared	to	the	back	or	stomach,	without	limiting	a	subject’s	ability	to	
engage	with	the	world	using	their	hands.	
In	order	to	practice	using	the	device,	subjects	were	told	what	was	in	front	
of	them,	or	felt	what	was	in	front	of	them,	when	they	were	wearing	the	device.	
The	idea	was	to	learn	what	tactile	stimulation	corresponded	to	what	objects	and	
properties	being	in	front	of	them.	The	goal	was	to	be	able	to	subsequently	
identify	things	using	only	the	device.	
After	wearing	such	devices	and	practicing	with	them	for	a	few	hours	
subjects	could:	
§ recognise	a	range	of	common	objects	in	front	of	them	at	a	distance	from	
their	body	such	as	a	cup,	a	telephone,	and	a	toy	horse;	
§ point	accurately	to	objects	in	space;	and	
																																																								
6	See	Campbell	(2006:	453).	
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§ judge	objects’	distance	and	absolute	size	(that	is	their	size	independent	of	
distance	from	the	subject/camera).	
In	order	for	the	practice	to	be	successful,	thereby	allowing	the	subjects	to	
subsequently	identify	things	using	only	the	device,	it	is	often	reported	that	the	
subjects	had	to	be	able	to	move	the	camera.	It	is	certainly	true	that	if	the	camera	
was	stationary	then	subjects	could	not	learn	to	use	the	device.	However,	it	is	an	
interesting	question	to	what	extent	self-movement	is	necessary.	For	example,	if	
the	camera	is	moved	by	another	person	but	subjects	know	how	it	was	being	
moved—either	because	they	are	told,	or	they	can	feel	the	camera	so	they	know	
how	it	is	being	moved—would	that	be	sufficient	to	allow	subjects	to	learn	to	use	
the	device?	Current	evidence	does	not	settle	this	question.	
Subjects	are	also	asked	to	report	what	it	is	like	for	them	when	they	are	
training	using	the	device.	They	say	that	initially	they	are	only	aware	of	the	tactile	
stimulus	and	tactile	experience	that	they	have.	However,	after	a	great	deal	of	
practice,	they	report	experiencing	objects	out	in	the	world	in	front	of	them.	This	
is	often	called	“externalising”	objects	and	properties.	They	do	not	report	the	
tactile	stimulus	or	a	tactile	experience	(although	they	can	pay	attention	to	the	
tactile	stimulation	if	they	want	to	and	come	to	report	on	a	tactile	experience).	
Moreover,	subjects	report	their	experience	in	quasi-visual	terms,	that	is,	using	
some	of	the	language	that	people	normally	use	to	report	their	visual	experience.	
(I	will	discuss	this	point	in	more	detail	below.)	
After	around	thirty	hours	of	practice	with	the	TVSS,	subjects:	
§ could	make	complex	pattern	discriminations;	
§ could	recognise	the	faces	of	members	of	laboratory	staff;	and	
§ displayed	a	looming	response	when	the	camera	lens	was	unexpectedly	
zoomed.	
The	second	point	is	illustrated	nicely	by	the	following	report	that	a	subject	gave	
when	identifying	what	was	in	front	of	her	while	using	a	TVSS	device:	“That	is	
Betty;	she	is	wearing	her	hair	down	today	and	does	not	have	her	glasses	on;	her	
mouth	is	open,	and	she	is	moving	her	right	hand	from	her	left	side	to	the	back	of	
her	head.”7	
Let	me	explain	the	third	point	in	more	detail.	When	a	camera	lens	is	
zoomed,	the	images	it	captures	changes	so	that	things	in	the	distance	appear	to	
move	forward	and	expand	their	apparent	size—that	is	they	increase	the	area	of	
the	image	that	they	occupy.	This	makes	it	look	as	if	things	in	the	distance	are	
rushing	toward	the	camera.	In	response	to	this	unexpected	event,	the	subjects	
automatically	moved	their	head	and	body	backwards—and	did	so	even	if	the	
tactile	sensation	that	they	were	receiving	was	on	their	back—seemingly	
supporting	the	subjects’	reports	that	they	localised	the	objects	that	they	were	
detecting	as	being	in	front	of	them	in	the	external	world,	and	not	where	the	
tactile	sensation	was.	
																																																								
7	Bach-y-Rita	(1972:	6)	
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Another	sensory	substitution	device	that	has	received	much	attention,	
study,	and	use	is	the	vOICe,	which	was	developed	by	Peter	Meijer.8	The	aim	is	to	
give	people	vision	by	using	the	sense	of	hearing,	and	so,	like	the	TVSS,	the	device	
is	used	by	either	blind	people	or	sighted	people	who	are	blindfolded.	This	device	
uses	a	camera	mounted	on	a	subject’s	forehead	or	glasses	and	converts	the	
camera	image	into	a	“soundscape”.	This	is	a	sound	stimulus	that	lasts	1	second	
that	begins	with	a	click	to	indicate	the	start	of	the	period.	Consider	the	X-axis	and	
Y-axis	of	a	camera	image.	The	X-axis	is	represented	by	the	duration	of	the	sound	
over	the	one	second.	The	Y-axis	is	represented	by	the	pitch	of	the	sound.	And	the	
volume	of	the	sound	corresponds	to	the	brightness	of	each	pixel.	This	means	that	
unlike	the	TVSS,	which	can	signal	only	black	and	white,	the	vOICe,	one	can	signal	
black	and	white	and	shades	of	grey	in	between.	
Consider	the	image	of	a	sloping	line	in	figure	one.	This	would	be	
represented	by	the	vOICe	by	a	click	to	indicate	the	start	of	the	image,	and	then	a	
brief	silence	followed	by	a	note	of	rising	pitch,	followed	by	a	brief	silence.	And	
consider	the	image	of	three	dots	in	figure	two.	This	would	be	represented	by	a	
click,	a	brief	silence,	and	then	a	brief	low	pitched	sound	followed	by	a	brief	
silence,	then	a	brief	high	pitched	sound	followed	by	a	brief	silence,	and	then	a	
brief	medium	pitched	sound	again	followed	by	a	brief	silence.	After	the	one-
second	duration	of	the	soundscape,	it	repeats	again,	starting	with	a	click.	More	
complex	images	elicit	more	complex	sounds,	with	highly	complex	sound	yielding	
very	highly	complex	soundscapes.	However,	as	with	the	TVSS,	with	practice,	
subjects	can	come	to	recognize	objects	using	the	device,	and	they	report	vision-
like	experiences:	reports	of	a	stable	world	appearing	to	be	in	front	of	them.	
	
	
Figure	1:	how	a	sloping	line	is	represented	by	the	vOICe	
	
																																																								
8	See	Meijer	(1992).	The	capitalisation	of	“OIC”	brings	to	mind	the	phrase,	“Oh,	I	see”.	
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Figure	2:	how	three	dots	is	represented	by	the	vOICe	
	
Now	that	I	have	described	two	of	the	most	used	and	studied	sensory	
substitution	devices,	I	turn	to	describe	one	sensory	augmentation	device:	the	
feelSpace	belt.	Recall	that	in	sensory	augmentation,	one	sense	is	used	to	try	to	
create	a	new	sense	or	enhance	an	existing	one.	The	feelSpace	belt,	developed	by	
Peter	König,	tries	to	give	people	a	sense	of	magnetic	north.	The	device	consists	of	
thirty	vibrating	actuators	fitted	on	the	inside	of	a	belt	that	is	worn	round	the	
waist.	A	compass	detects	magnetic	north,	and	makes	the	actuator	that	is	facing	
north	vibrate.	As	the	wearer	moves	around,	the	actuator	that	vibrates	changes	as	
the	wearer’s	orientation	towards	magnetic	north	alters.	After	six	weeks	training	
consisting	of	wearing	the	belt	constantly,	subjects	who	wore	the	belt	were	better	
than	controls	at	certain	navigation	tasks.	Nagel	et	al.	(2005)	report	that	two	out	
of	four	subjects	that	were	trained	to	use	the	belt	reported	changes	in	their	
perceptual	experience.	They	said	that	it	was	hard	to	describe	the	new	experience,	
but	that	it	was	a	sense	of	space	different	to	that	which	they	had	before.	They	
were	more	aware	of	the	direction	of	their	home	or	office	when	they	were	at	
various	different	locations.	One	subject	said	“reference	points	are	intuitively	
present	and	help	a	lot	in	navigating	around	and	understanding	relations	between	
places”	(Nagel	(2005:	R22).	This	awareness	was	clearly	distinguished	from	the	
additional	tactile	stimulation	that	the	belt	provided. Surprisingly,	the	additional	
spatial	awareness	was	relative	to	landmarks,	not	to	magnetic	north,	as	the	
experimenters	had	expected. 
I	have	now	explained	what	sensory	substitution	and	augmentation	are,	
and	I	have	explained	the	workings	of	three	devices.	The	devices	allowed	
discriminations	of	objects	or	directions	in	new	ways,	and	in	the	two	sensory	
substitution	cases,	subjects	often	reported	having	new	experiences	described	in	
quasi-visual	terms.	In	the	sensory	augmentation	case	two	subjects	reported	
having	new	experiences.	In	the	next	section,	I	will	examine	the	evidence	
concerning	whether	new	experiences	are	had	and,	in	the	section	following	that,	I	
will	consider	whether	those	alleged	experiences	in	a	new	modality.	Subsequently,	
I	will	examine	other	properties	of	those	alleged	experiences.	
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1.3	Do	Subjects	Have	a	New	Sensory	Experience?	
In	this	section	I	will	focus	on	what	is	reported	to	be	the	new	“quasi-visual”	
experience	that	subjects	come	to	have	after	practice	with	the	TVSS	and	the	vOICe.	
Do	subjects	come	to	have	a	new	sensory	experience,	as	they	often	report?	Recall	
that	many	subjects	reported	a	new	experience	of	stable	objects	in	space	external	
to,	and	in	front	of,	themselves.	What	is	clear	is	that	new	information	is	getting	to	
the	subjects	that	allows	them	to	do	things	they	couldn’t	do	before:	identify	and	
discriminate	objects.	But	are	subjects	doing	this	because	they	have	a	new	
experience	in	addition	to	or	instead	of	that	experience	which	they	had	at	the	
start	of	their	training—an	experience	in	addition	to	or	instead	of	the	tactile	
experience	in	the	case	of	the	TVSS,	or	the	auditory	experience	in	the	case	of	the	
vOICe?	The	alternative	to	the	idea	that	they	did	have	a	new	experience	is	the	idea	
the	subjects	just	come	to	make	new	judgments	or	come	to	form	new	beliefs	
about	objects	that	are	front	of	themselves—judgments	or	beliefs	that	are	
inferred	from	the	tactile	or	auditory	experiences	that	they	have	at	the	start	of	
their	training	with	the	sensory	substitution	devices	and	that	they	continue	to	
have	throughout	the	training.	
	 It	is	very	difficult,	in	general,	to	tell	when	a	subject	is	having	a	sensory	
experience	about	something	as	opposed	to	making	a	judgment	or	having	a	belief	
about	that	thing.9	So	even	in	cases	of	perception	that	do	not	involve	sensory	
substitution	or	augmentation	there	are	often	disputes	about	what	is,	say	visually	
experienced,	and	what	is	simply	believed	in	response	to	that	visual	experience.	
One	reason	is	that	philosophers	are	not	agreed	on	what	objects	and	properties	
visual	experience	can	represent,	and	thus	on	what	sorts	of	visual	experiences	
there	are.	Some	philosophers	think	that	only	low-level	properties	such	a	size,	
shape	and	colour	can	be	represented	in	visual	experience,	while	others	think	that	
many	other	properties	besides	can	be	represented,	such	as	natural	kind	
properties,	like	being	a	pine-tree,	or	artificial	kind	properties,	such	as	being	a	
table.10	Moreover,	some	philosophers	think	that	experience	simply	is	belief	or	
the	acquisition	of	belief.	For	example,	David	Armstrong	held	that	“perception	is	
nothing	but	the	acquiring	of	knowledge	of,	or,	on	occasions,	the	acquiring	of	an	
inclination	to	believe	in,	particular	facts	about	the	physical	world,	by	means	of	
our	senses,"	(1961:	105).	Along	similar	lines,	more	recently,	Katherin	Glüer-
Pagin	(2009)	has	argued	that	experiences	are	beliefs	with	contents	of	the	form	x	
looks	F.	
	 In	what	follows,	I	will	assume	that	sensory	experiences	are	not	to	be	
equated	with	judgments	or	belief	on	the	grounds	that	sensory	experiences	have	a	
distinctive	sort	of	phenomenology	(by	which	I	mean	subjective	character,	or	way	
that	it	is	like,	for	the	subject	of	the	experience)	that	judging	or	believing	lacks,	
and	on	the	grounds	that	perceptual	experiences	play	a	different	rational	role,	and	
have	a	different	structure,	from	that	of	belief	and	judgment.11	And,	for	ease	of	
																																																								
9	See	Macpherson	(2012)	for	detailed	discussion.	
10	This	debate	is	summarised	in	Macpherson	(2011b).	
11	See	Crane	(1992)	on	these	latter	two	points.	
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exposition,	I	will	talk	as	if	sensory	experiences	can	have	high-level	content.	
(Nothing	turns	on	this.	Those	people	who	believe	that	experiences	do	not	have	
high-level	contents	can	simply	take	my	descriptions	of	experiences	with	high-
level	contents	as	specifying,	in	an	informal	manner,	experiences	with	the	sort	of	
low-level	contents	that	they	would	suppose	such	specifications	to	suggest.)	
	 So,	how	can	we	tell	whether	the	subjects	who	use	the	TVSS	and	the	vOICe	
have	new	experiences	about	objects	in	the	world	in	front	of	them	or	whether	
they	simply	make	judgments	about	such	objects	based	on	their	tactile	or	
auditory	experience?	What	evidence	is	there	that	can	help	us	decide	whether	
subjects	are	having	new	experiences?	
	 One	piece	of	evidence	is	the	looming	response—the	automatic	moving	
backwards	away	from	the	direction	in	which	the	camera	is	pointed—that	TVSS	
subjects	exhibit	when	the	camera	lens	is,	unbeknown	to	the	them,	zoomed	in,	
which	I	mentioned	in	the	previous	section.	People	have	been	impressed	with	this	
fact,	pointing	out,	particularly,	that	this	effect	occurs	even	when	the	tactile	
stimulation	is	on	a	subject’s	back.	Subjects	don’t	try	to	move	away	from	the	
location	of	the	tactile	stimulation,	but	from	the	direction	in	which	the	camera	is	
pointing,	suggesting	that	they	are	experiencing	objects	in	front	of	them	in	the	
direction	that	the	camera	is	pointed.	It	is	argued	that	the	fast	automatic	looming	
response	could	only	be	driven	by	sensory	experience	of	objects	in	front	of	the	
subject,	and	could	not	be	driven	by	judgment,	which	does	not	occur	quickly	
enough	to	drive	the	response.	It	is	argued	that	perceptual	experience	occurs	
more	quickly	than	judgment,	which	occurs	as	a	response	to,	and	hence	at	a	later	
time	than,	such	experience.	
	 However,	one	might	question	the	premises	of	this	argument.	Might	there	
not	be	fast	automatic	judgment	formation	once	subjects	have	practiced	
sufficiently	using	a	device?	Do	we	have	really	good	evidence	that	judgment	could	
not	occur	on	the	sort	of	timescale	that	could	drive	the	looming	response?	I	
believe	that	this	issue	has	not	been	investigated	enough.	Another	concern	stems	
from	the	performance	of	subjects	in	identifying	objects	using	sensory	
substitution:	it	does	not	seem	to	be	a	fast	automatic	process	at	all.	Most	subjects	
have	to	pay	great	attention	and	be	fully	engaged	with	the	task	of	identifying	the	
objects	in	front	of	them	in	order	to	succeed	at	it.	Moreover,	recognition	of	an	
object	in	around	ten	seconds	would	be	considered	a	good	performance	using	a	
sensory	substitution	device.	This	is	clearly	far	longer	than	one	would	take	to	
recognise	an	object	if	one	had	a	normal	visual	experience	of	it.	One	thought	is	
that	the	experiences	or	judgments	of	objects’	identity	may	take	some	time	to	
have,	but	there	may	be	a	basic	experience,	an	experience	simply	as	of	something	
being	out	in	the	world	in	front	of	them,	that	subjects	have	that	precedes	the	
experience	or	judgment	that	subjects	have	of	objects’	identity.	Another	thought	is	
that	subjects	can	make	a	fast	automatic	judgment	that	something	is	out	in	the	
world	in	front	of	them,	which	precedes	the	identification	of	which	objects	are	in	
front	of	them.	It	is	very	hard	to	determine	which	is	the	correct	account.	
Another	fact	that	some	people	think	tells	in	favour	of	the	hypothesis	that	
subjects	are	having	a	new	sensory	experience	is	that	congenitally	blind	people	
who	use	sensory	substitution	devices	report	that	they	come	to	have	perceptual	
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concepts	that	they	did	not	have	before—concepts	such	as	parallax,	perspective,	
shadow,	and	interposition	of	objects.	One	could	try	to	argue	that	the	best	
explanation	of	this	new	concept	formation	is	that	the	congenitally	blind	people	
are	having	new	experiences,	which	allows	them	to	grasp	the	perceptual	concepts	
that	they	did	not	previously.	
However,	one	might	question	this	conclusion	on	the	ground	that	there	is	a	
good	alternative	explanation	of	what	is	going	on	that	has	not	been	ruled	out.	That	
explanation	is	that	the	congenitally	blind	subjects	can	simply	form	new	beliefs	
about	what	is	in	front	of	them,	and	the	relationship	that	those	objects	bear	to	
them	in	egocentric	space,	and	that	it	is	coming	to	have	these	new	beliefs	that	
explains	why	they	gain	the	new	perceptual	concepts.	This	explanation	gains	
further	support	from	the	detailed	observations	of	Kennedy	(1993)	that	
congenitally	blind	people	can	make	and	use	raised-line	drawings	using	touch,	
and	in	virtue	of	doing	so,	come	to	have	concepts,	such	a	perspective,	that	
previously	it	was	thought	they	could	not	have.	This	suggests	that	there	are	many	
ways	that	blind	people	could	come	to	have	these	concepts	and	new	visual	
experiences	are	not	required.	
A	third	piece	of	evidence	that	people	have	used	to	argue	for	the	
conclusion	that	subjects	are	having	new	experiences,	is	that	one	can	create	
correlates	of	visual	illusions	using	sensory	substitution	devices.	For	example,	
Renier	et	al.	(2005)	created	a	version	of	the	Ponzo	illusion	using	an	auditory-
visual	sensory	substitution	device.	In	the	Ponzo	illusion,	two	lines	of	equal	length	
appear	unequal	when	they	are	placed	at	different	positions	on	converging	
lines.12	And	Bach-y-Rita	(1984)	reports	creating	the	waterfall	illusion	using	the	
TVSS.	The	waterfall	illusion	is	one	in	which	stationary	objects	appear	to	be	
moving.	It	is	caused	by	looking	first	at	a	constantly	moving	stimulus	for	some	
time	before	looking	at	stationary	objects.	13	How	can	this	piece	of	evidence	be	
used	to	argue	that	subjects	are	having	new	experiences?	Importantly,	one	can	get	
these	illusions	to	persist,	even	when	the	subject	knows	conclusively	that	they	are	
illusions.	This	is	crucial	because	the	persistence	of	a	state	that	represents	the	
world	to	be	some	way,	in	the	face	of	conclusive	counter	evidence	that	they	world	
is	not	that	way,	is	one	of	the	standard	tests	used	to	identify	that	a	state	is	a	
perceptual	experience	rather	than	a	judgment.	The	reason	is	that	if	one	judged	
something	to	be	the	case,	and	then	conclusive	counter	evidence	was	brought	
against	that	judgment,	then	one	would	expect	one’s	judgment	to	change—at	least	
it	ought	to	change,	on	pain	of	irrationality.	However,	this	is	not	the	case	for	
perceptual	experiences.	Illusory	perceptual	experiences	can,	and	do,	persist	in	
the	face	of	conclusive	counter	evidence,	without	one	being	irrational.	Thus,	the	
creation	of	representational	states	that	persist	despite	the	subject	knowing	that	
they	are	not	veridical,	and	without	evidence	to	think	that	they	are	being	
irrational,	provides	some	evidence	in	favour	of	the	thought	that	the	states	
created	are	perceptual	experiences	and	not	judgments.	
																																																								
12	The	Ponzo	illusion	can	be	seen	and	is	discussed	in	this	online	article:	Donaldson	and	
Macpherson	(July	2017).	
13	The	waterfall	illusion	can	be	seen	online	and	is	discussed	in	Macpherson	and	Baysan	
(September,	2017).	
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Unfortunately,	however,	that	evidence	is	not	conclusive.	One	can	defend	
the	view	that	a	judgment	rather	than	a	perceptual	experience	is	being	created	by	
the	use	of	sensory	substitution	devices	by	claiming	that	the	judgment	formed	is	
not	one	that	represents,	say,	that	there	are	lines	of	unequal	length	in	front	of	
one—a	judgment	that	would	have	to	be	overturned	by	the	conclusive	counter	
evidence	that	the	lines	were	of	equal	length,	on	pain	of	irrationality—but	a	
judgment,	say,	to	the	effect	that	there	are	lines	that	appear	to	be	of	unequal	
length	in	front	of	one.	That	judgment	need	not	vanish	in	the	face	of	conclusive	
counter	evidence	because	how	things	are	does	not	strictly	determine	how	things	
appear.	Thus,	unfortunately,	this	alleged	test	for	perceptual	experience	is	not	as	
conclusive	as	one	would	hope.	Further	debate	on	this	topic	would	have	to	
consider	whether	the	notion	of	appearance	that	this	defence	uses	can	be	cashed	
out	in	a	way	that	does	not	make	reference	to	perceptual	experience.	
One	might	think	that	one	could	settle	the	issue	by	scanning	the	brains	of	
subjects	who	are	using	sensory	substitution	devices	to	find	out	whether	they	are	
having	a	perceptual	experience—and	if	so	in	which	sensory	modality—or	
whether	they	are	making	a	judgment.	However	doing	that	would	have	to	rely	on	
having	clearly	established	correlations	between	experiences	in	certain	
modalities	and	their	absence.	But	when	creating	experience	in	unusual	ways,	
such	as	through	substitution,	it	is	far	from	clear	that	we	know	enough	about	such	
correlations	to	determine	through	scanning	what	is	going	on.	For	example,	while	
people	used	to	think	that	each	sensory	modality	was	associated	with	a	different	
area	of	the	cortex,	increasingly,	people	are	now	doubtful	whether	there	are	any	
areas	of	the	cortex	that	are	solely	correlated	with	one	modality.14	In	particular,	
what	is	called	the	“visual”	cortex	may	be	active	whenever	any	spatial	experience	
is	had,	rather	than	whenever	any	visual	experience	is	had.	Moreover,	one	also	has	
to	bear	in	mind	that	when	people	lose,	or	have	never	had,	a	particular	sense	then	
their	brain	develops	in	a	nonstandard	way	and	areas	of	the	cortex	that	would	
otherwise	have	been	used	to	process	information	from	a	particular	sense	may	be	
co-opted	to	do	other	tasks,	making	it	difficult	to	draw	conclusions	about	what	
sort	of	mental	state	is	occurring	from	the	area	of	the	brain	that	is	active.	For	
example,	stimulating	the	“visual”	cortex	of	early	blind	subjects	using	transcranial	
magnetic	stimulation	(TMS)	during	braille	reading	produced	tactile	experiences	
in	early	blind	subjects,	which	were	reported	as	the	existence	of	extra	dots,	
missing	dots,	or	dots	that	did	not	make	sense.15	
One	might	think	that	the	way	forward	is	to	study	the	detailed	reports	of	
the	subjects’	experience.	Can	we	not	rely	on	subjects’	reports	of	their	own	mental	
states	to	determine	whether	they	are	having	a	new	experience?	
As	I	discussed	earlier,	many	users	of	sensory	substitution	report	having	a	
distinctive	new	experience.	But	how	reliable	are	such	reports?	There	is	no	
objective	test	to	see	whether	a	subject’s	report	of	having	an	experience	is	correct,	
or	whether,	in	general,	a	subject	is	reliable	in	reporting	his	or	her	mental	life.	
And	even	if	we	take	the	case	of	ordinary	mundane	experience	that	many	of	us	
																																																								
14	For	example,	Vetter	et	al.	(2014)	have	found	that	they	can	read	off	“visual”	cortex	what	
auditory	stimulus	a	subject	has	heard.	
15	See	Cohen	et	al.	(1997).	
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regularly	have,	such	as	our	common	or	garden	visual	experience	of	objects	in	
front	of	us	had	through	using	our	eyes,	there	is	disagreement	as	to	what	that	
experience	is	like.	I	have	already	mentioned	above	that	there	is	disagreement	on	
whether	natural	or	artificial	kinds	can	be	represented	by	experience.	But	there	
are	also	debates	about	whether	visual	experience	is	of	a	three-dimensional	world,	
or	of	a	two-dimensional	world	with	an	accompanying	judgment	representing	the	
third	dimension—a	debate	that	has	persisted	for	hundreds	of	years.16	Another	
case	in	point	is	whether	our	visual	experience	is	as	rich	as	we	normally	take	it	to	
be.	Some	people	think	that	our	experience	is	not	as	detailed	and	highly	precise	as	
we	typically	take	it	to	be,	and	that	we	do	not	represent	colour	in	the	periphery	of	
our	visual	field.	If	they	are	right,	then	most	of	us	misreport	our	visual	experience	
a	lot	of	the	time.	I	am	not	here	endorsing	the	view	that	experience	is	not	as	rich	
as	we	take	it	to	be,	but	using	the	disagreement	about	this	issue	to	show	that	
there	are	a	variety	of	considerations—this	one	being	a	rather	radical	one—that	
may	lead	us	not	to	trust	subjects’	reports	about	their	experience.	
Moreover,	when	it	comes	to	the	experiences	that	are	reported	when	
subjects	are	using	sensory	substitution	and	augmentation	devices,	there	is	
actually	quite	some	disagreement	about	the	nature	of	the	experience.	Recall	that	
two	out	of	four	of	the	subjects	that	trained	with	the	feelSpace	belt	said	that	they	
had	new	experiences	of	the	space	around	them.	But	two	of	the	subjects	did	not	
report	that	they	had	such	new	experiences.	What	is	going	on?	Are	two	of	the	
participants	correct	and	two	wrong?	How	could	we	tell?	Or	are	both	right:	two	
correctly	reporting	that	they	had	no	new	experience	and	two	correctly	reporting	
that	they	did	have	a	new	experience?	Likewise,	among	those	who	report	quasi-
visual	experience	when	using	the	TVSS	or	the	vOICe,	some	report	that	they	have	
two-dimensional	experience,	and	some	report	that	they	have	three-dimensional	
experience.17	Are	some	of	those	people	misreporting	their	experience,	and	if	so	
which?	Or	are	people	just	different	and	some	have	two-dimensional	experience	
and	some	have	three-dimensional	experience?	
There	are	numerous	reasons	to	think	that	some	people	have	a	new	
experience	and	some	do	not—and	therefore	that	there	are	simply	interpersonal	
differences	among	those	who	use	sensory	substitution	and	augmentation	devices.	
If	that	is	true,	there	is	reason	to	think	that	the	different	reports	by	the	subjects	
reflect	this	fact.	In	other	words,	disparate	reports	do	not	necessarily	indicate	that	
we	should	not	trust	the	reports	because	some	are	not	accurate.	I	will	now	explain	
what	reasons	there	are	to	think	that	there	could	be	interpersonal	differences	
among	sensory	substitution	users—reasons	that	I	think	not	enough	people	who	
are	thinking	about	this	issue	take	suitable	account	of,	and	so	overlook	the	idea	
that	some	people	may	be	having	new	experiences	while	other	people	may	only	
be	making	new	judgments.	
The	first	reason	is	that	people	who	use	sensory	substitution	devices	have	
different	sorts	of	ability.	While	some	people	using	these	devices	have	no	
disability	and	are	normally	sighted	(typically	wearing	a	blindfold	when	using	the	
sensory	substitution	device),	some	people	are	late	blind,	some	early	blind,	and	
																																																								
16	See	Smith	(2000).	
17	See	Ward	and	Meijer	(2010).	
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some	are	congenitally	blind.	There	is	reason	to	think	that	different	kinds	of	
subjects	using	these	devices	will	have	different	responses	because	their	brains	
have	developed	in	different	ways.	Second,	we	need	to	bear	in	mind	that	sensory	
substitution	devices	are	different	from	one	another.	Perhaps	some	sensory	
substitution	devices	are	more	likely	to	give	new	sensory	experiences	than	
others;	or	some	more	likely	to	give	two-dimensional	experience,	and	some	more	
likely	to	give	three-dimensional	experience.	Third,	it	is	also	important	to	note	the	
different	training	regimes	that	people	have	undergone	when	they	are	making	
their	reports	about	their	experience.	Sometimes	people	have	undergone	tens	of	
hours	of	practice	with	a	device.	Sometimes	people	have	undergone	hundreds	of	
hours	of	practice.	And	in	one	case,	a	subject	used	a	device	for	four	years,	and	
during	two	of	those	years	they	used	the	device	constantly.	Fourth,	is	the	different	
level	of	motivation	of	subjects	using	a	device.	Some	people	are	exceptionally	
keen	to	use	a	device	and	to	find	out	what	information	they	can	get	about	the	
world	using	it.	Some	subjects	become	very	quickly	demotivated	when	using	a	
device.	They	are	disappointed	that	the	use	of	the	device	doesn’t	give	instant	
results.	They	are	put	off	on	account	of	how	it	feels	to	use	the	device—sometimes	
by	how	frustrating	it	is	to	learn	to	use	it,	sometimes	by	the	lack	of	affect	that	they	
feel	while	using	the	device—and	they	therefore	don’t	like	to	use	it.	Not	
surprisingly,	this	motivational	factor	might	affect	what	happens	to	a	subject	
when	they	use	the	device.	For	example,	it	may	be	that	sustained	attention	and	
effort	is	required	in	order	to	come	to	have	a	new	experience	and	that	is	unlikely	
to	occur	in	people	who	are	not	highly	motivated	to	practice	with	the	device.	
Finally,	fifth,	there	may	just	be	innate	differences	between	people	that	determine	
whether	or	not	they	have	a	new	experience	after	practice	with	a	sensory	
substitution	or	augmentation	device.	In	short,	there	are	many	complex	factors	
that	may	affect	what	it	is	like	for	people	to	use	these	devices,	and	thus	what	they	
report.	Researchers	should	be	very	careful	not	to	over-generalise	and	drawn	
conclusions	about	what	is	happening	in	all	instances	of	sensory	substitution	and	
augmentation	use,	when	their	evidence	base	consists	in	just	a	limited	range	of	
instances	of	that	use.	
To	sum	up	this	section,	showing	that	subjects	do	have	a	new	experience,	
rather	than	come	to	make	new	judgments	about	the	world,	is	a	real	challenge.	
There	are	no	straightforward	decisive	practical	tests	for	determining	whether	a	
mental	state	is	a	perceptual	experience	or	a	judgment.	And	most	likely	there	are	
complex	interpersonal	differences	that	mean	that	we	have	to	look	carefully	at	the	
precise	details	of	each	case	to	try	to	decide	what	is	going	on	in	that	case.	We	will	
probably	have	to	weigh	the	evidence	carefully	in	each	case	and	decide	where	the	
balance	of	probability	lies.	
In	the	next	section,	I	will	suppose	that	(at	least	some)	subjects	using	
sensory	substitution	devices	are	having	new	experiences	and	I	will	investigate	
what	we	should	think	the	nature	of	those	experiences	is.	
	
1.4	What	is	the	Nature	of	the	Experience	Produced	by	Sensory	Substitution?	
Let	us	suppose	that	(at	least	some)	subjects	who	use	sensory	substitution	
devices	for	some	reasonable	period	of	time	come	to	have	new	experiences.	What	
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are	those	experiences	like?	I	will	first	investigate	what	the	modality	of	the	
experience	is.	Second,	I	will	investigate	whether	the	experiences	are	of	a	two-
dimensional	world	or	of	a	three-dimensional	world.	Third,	I	will	consider	
whether	the	experiences	represent	colour,	and	if	not,	what	that	means	these	
experiences	are	like.	
	
1.4.1	The	Modality	Issue	
Consider	TVSS	use.	Are	people	using	vision	to	perceive	the	world	(that	is,	the	
substituted	modality)	or	are	they	using	touch	(that	is,	the	substituting	modality)?	
And	are	the	new	experiences	that	some	people	have	visual	ones	or	tactile	ones?	
And	consider	the	vOICe.	Are	people	using	vision	to	perceive	the	world	(that	is,	
the	substituted	modality)	or	are	they	using	hearing	(that	is,	the	substituting	
modality)?	And	are	the	new	experiences	visual	ones	or	auditory	ones?	Or	are	
none	of	these	descriptions	correct?	In	order	to	think	about	these	questions	we	
need	to	step	back	a	little	and	consider	the	factors	that	differentiate	the	sensory	
modalities.	
There	are	four	traditional	competing	views	about	how	one	should	
individuate	the	senses.	One	view	is	that	what	determines	the	type	of	a	sensory	
modality	is	the	nature	of	the	sensory	organ:	an	eye	in	the	case	of	vision;	an	ear	in	
the	case	of	hearing;	skin	in	the	case	of	touch;	and	so	on.18	A	second	view	is	that	
what	determines	the	identity	of	a	sensory	modality	is	the	nature	of	the	proximal	
stimulus	that	impacts	on	the	sensory	organ.	So,	for	example,	light	in	the	case	of	
vision;	sound	waves	in	a	medium	in	the	case	of	hearing;	pressure	and	
temperature	in	the	case	of	touch;	and	so	on.	A	third	view	is	that	what	is	
important	is	what	the	experiences	in	a	modality	represent.	So,	for	example,	the	
shape,	size,	and	colour	of	objects	at	a	distance	from	the	body	in	the	case	of	vision;	
sounds	or	objects	producing	sounds,	including	pitch,	volume,	and	timbre	
properties	in	the	case	of	hearing;	and	the	shape,	size,	surface	texture,	and	
temperature	of	objects	pressing	up	against	the	body,	including	the	pressure	with	
which	they	press	in	the	case	of	touch;	and	likewise	for	the	other	senses.	The	
fourth	traditional	view	is	that	what	is	important	is	the	conscious	nature	of	the	
experiences	that	the	modality	produces—which	is	determined	by	what	it	is	like	
to	have	them	(or	their	“phenomenal	character”).	The	idea	here	is	that	visual	
experiences,	auditory	experiences,	tactile	experiences,	and	so	on,	each	have	a	
unique	feel	to	them	that	determines	the	modality	that	is	operative.	
Many	people	think	that	the	phenomenal	character	of	an	experience	is	to	a	
large	extent	determined	by	what	an	experience	represents.	This	is	because	when	
																																																								
18	For	the	purposes	of	this	essay,	I	will	assume	that	touch	is	one	modality.	However,	that	fact	has	
been	questioned.	Plato	thought	that	what	is	commonly	thought	of	as	touch	is	really	three	distinct	
senses:	a	pressure,	a	temperature,	and	a	pain	sense,	partly	on	the	grounds	that	there	are	three	
very	different	sorts	of	phenomenal	experience	associated	with	each	of	these.	Some	modern	
scientists	also	believe	that	touch	is	actually	three	modalities	but	for	different	reasons.	They	have	
found	that	there	are	distinctive	receptors	that	detect	temperature,	pressure,	and	painful	stimuli,	
and	that	there	are	separate	spots	in	the	skin	receptive	to	pressure,	warmth,	cold	and	painful	
stimuli.	And	so	on	these	grounds	they	posit	there	are	three	distinct	senses.	See	Macpherson	
(2011a).	
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we	describe	the	phenomenal	character	of	our	experience	we	typically	do	so	by	
describing	what	objects	and	properties	the	experience	represents.	These	people	
would	consider	the	third	and	fourth	criteria	to	be	the	same	or	to	yield	the	same	
results.	
While	these	accounts	of	the	individuation	of	the	senses	all	agree	on	the	
fact	that	vision,	audition,	touch,	taste,	and	smell—the	five	Aristotelian	senses—
operating	normally	and	in	normal	conditions	are	all	different	from	each	other,	
they	are	competing	theories	because	they	yield	different	answers	in	other	cases	
about	what	type	a	particular	sense	is.	To	explain	this,	I	will	consider	what	each	
theory	says	about	the	sense	that	is	being	used	when	someone	uses	a	TVSS.	
The	first	theory	says	that	what	is	important	is	the	nature	of	the	sensory	
organ.	In	the	TVSS,	what	is	the	sensory	organ?	It	is	tempting	to	think	that	the	
sensory	organ	is	the	camera	that	is	detecting	the	scene	in	front	of	the	subject.	
And	it	might	be	tempting	to	think	that	the	camera	is	a	type	of	eye.	With	those	
assumptions	in	place,	this	theory	would	yield	the	result	that	the	sense	being	used	
is	vision.	However,	one	could	deny	that	a	camera	is	an	eye—it	is	just	a	man-made	
camera.	In	that	case,	this	theory	would	yield	the	result	that	the	sense	is	a	new	
one—one	that	has	a	camera	for	an	organ.	Alternatively,	one	could	argue	that	the	
sensory	organ	is	the	skin,	for	it	is	the	skin	that	is	the	organ	of	the	subject	that	
receives	a	stimulus.	With	that	assumption	in	place,	this	theory	would	say	that	the	
sensory	modality	is	touch.	Another	option	would	be	to	think	of	the	whole	TVSS	
system	as	being	the	sensory	organ—the	camera	plus	the	vibrating	pins	and	the	
subject’s	skin.	This	would	mean	that	the	sense	was	a	new	one—neither	vision	
nor	touch.	
It	is	interesting	to	note	that	this	theory	does	not	tell	us	how	to	determine	
which	physical	object	is	the	sensory	organ,	and	it	does	not	tell	us	how	to	identify	
what	type	of	organ	something	is.	The	theory	needs	supplementing	by	accounts	of	
those	things	in	order	to	yield	a	verdict.	
The	second	theory	says	that	what	is	important	is	the	nature	of	the	
proximal	stimulus.	But	what	is	that?	When	considering	the	previous	theory	we	
noted	that	we	could	take	the	sensory	organ	to	be	either	the	camera	or	the	skin.	In	
using	this	second	theory,	we	face	a	similar	choice.	We	could	take	the	proximal	
stimulus	to	be	the	light	that	hits	the	camera,	or	we	could	take	it	to	be	the	
pressure	of	the	pins	that	touch	the	subjects’	skin.	The	former	would	yield	the	
verdict	that	the	sense	in	operation	was	sight.	The	latter	would	yield	the	verdict	
that	the	sense	in	operation	was	touch.	
Again	note	that	this	theory	does	not	tell	us	how	to	determine	what	the	
proximal	stimulus	is	in	unusual	cases.	And	it	also	does	not	specify	what	the	
proximal	stimuli	is	for	the	normal	operation	of	the	Aristotelian	senses	in	normal	
conditions.	For	example,	is	visible	light—light	of	roughly	400–750	nanometres—
the	proximal	stimulus	of	vision,	or	is	the	proximal	stimulus	any	form	of	
electromagnetic	radiation,	so	that	a	sense	that	detected	gamma	rays,	or	x-rays	or	
microwaves	or	radio	waves	would	count	as	vision?	
The	third	theory	tells	us	to	look	to	what	the	experiences	produced	by	a	
sensory	modality	represent.	Here	one	might	think	that	we	can	discern	a	clearer	
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result.	Haven’t	we	determined	that	the	new	experiences	had	in	sensory	
substitution	represent	objects	in	front	of	the	body	of	the	subject?	Do	they	
therefore	not	represent	that	which	visual	experiences	represent?	The	
experiences	using	TVSS	seem	to	represent	more	closely	that	which	vision	does,	
compared	to	any	other	sensory	modality,	and	so	one	might	conclude	that	the	
modality	in	operation	here	is	vision.	19	However,	as	I	will	spell	out	in	more	detail	
later,	it	is	plausible	to	think	that	some	or	all	of	these	experiences	do	not	
represent	colour.	For	many	people,	including	Aristotle,	that	is	a	defining	feature	
of	visual	experience,	and	so	they	hold	that	if	an	experience	does	not	represent	
colour	then	it	cannot	be	visual.	(I,	myself,	see	no	reason	to	reason	to	think	that	
colour	must	be	represented	by	visual	experiences,	as	I	will	explain	below.)	What	
type	of	experiences	are	such	experiences	then?	They	don’t	seem	like	tactile	
experiences,	as,	unlike	tactile	experiences,	they	represent	objects	at	a	distance	
from	the	body,	and	they	don’t	represent	pressure	or	temperature.	So	perhaps	
they	are	a	novel	type	of	experience.	
However,	one	might	try	to	make	a	case	that	those	experiences	are	tactile.	
Some	psychologists	have	postulated	that	practice	using	a	sensory	substitution	
device	gives	one	a	novel	experience	but	one	that	is	in	the	substituting	modality.	
They	have	suggested	that	learning	to	use	a	sensory	substation	device	is	a	bit	like	
learning	certain	language	skills,	such	as	learning	to	read	or	learning	a	new	
language.	For	example,	Bach-y-Rita	said:	
The	learning	process	may	be	similar	to	that	which	takes	place	in	children	with	
normal	sensory	and	motor	systems,	or	in	adults	learning	a	foreign	language	or	
Morse	code,	or	in	deaf	persons	learning	manual	communication	(1984:	153).	
And	Jones	says:	
Meijer	likens	the	process	of	learning	to	recognize	sounds	as	shapes	to	acquiring	
a	foreign	language.	Novices	begin	by	mastering	an	elementary	visual	alphabet:	a	
circle,	a	rectangle,	a	triangle,	an	oval.	Since,	generally	speaking,	all	other	shapes	
can	be	said	to	be	combinations	of	these,	the	wearer	of	such	a	device	begins	to	
gain	‘fluency’	that	makes	recognizing	whether	a	door	is	open	or	closed,	or	
whether	a	chair	is	occupied,	almost	second	nature	(2004).	
When	one	learns	to	read,	one	learns	to	recognize	words,	which	one	could	
not	do	before.	Recognising	words	becomes	fast	and	automatic,	but	we	don’t	think	
																																																								
19	In	section	three,	I	mentioned	that	there	may	be	interpersonal	difference	between	people	with	
regard	to	whether	they	come	to	have	new	sensory	experiences	or	whether	they	come	to	be	able	
to	make	new	judgments	about	the	world.	Of	course	it	could	be	the	case	that	the	phenomenal	
character	of	new	experiences	produced	by	sensory	substitution	devices	is	different	from	subject	
to	subject.	For	example,	Auvry	et	al.	(2007)	asked	sighted	participants	what	it	felt	like	to	perceive	
with	the	vOICe.	Some	participants	said	that	their	experience	was	close	to	vision,	others	that	it	
was	closer	to	audition.	And	one	of	the	participants	said	that	her	experience	was	visual	when	she	
was	locating	an	object	in	space,	and	auditory	when	she	was	recognizing	the	shape	of	the	object.	In	
the	text	above,	I	focus	on	the	reports	of	the	subjects	in	TVSS	case,	which	seem	less	variable.	Again,	
note	that	the	device	used,	and	the	amount	of	practice	subjects	have,	and	which	task	they	are	
performing,	are	among	three	of	many	factors	(the	others	of	which	I	outlined	in	section	three)	that	
might	affect	the	nature	of	subjects’	mental	states	when	using	a	sensory	substitution	device.	
Therefore,	there	may	again	be	large	interpersonal	differences	between	people	when	using	
sensory	substitution	devices.	
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that	people	are	having	nonvisual	experiences	when	they	are	reading.	It	seems	
that	they	come	to	have	a	new	type	of	visual	experience	that	allows	them	to	
recognize	new	things.	Perhaps	this	is	a	good	analogy	for	what	goes	on	in	those	
who	practice	a	lot	with	the	TVSS.	They	are	having	new	tactile	experiences	that	
allow	them	to	recognize	objects	at	a	distance	from	their	body	which	they	could	
not	do	before.	
Another	option	is	to	think	that	the	new	experiences	are	amodal	or	meta-
modal	experiences	in	the	sense	that	they	represent	that	which	one	might	think	
all	sensory	modalities	can	represent:	objects	occupying	certain	portions	of	space.	
However,	it	is	not	entirely	certain	that	every	modality	can	represent	that.	Can	
smell,	for	example?	Exactly	what	smell	experiences	represent	is	highly	disputed.	
(See	Batty	(2013)	for	discussion	of	this	modality.)	Perhaps	then	they	are	amodal	
or	meta-modal	in	the	sense	that	at	least	two	sensory	modalities	can	represent	
those	objects	and	properties	and	spatial	relations.	Another	option	is	that	they	are	
experiences	in	a	novel	modality—neither	vision	nor	touch.	I	favour	this	last	
option,	as	I	will	explain	below.	
According	to	the	fourth	theory	we	need	to	think	about	the	phenomenal	
character	of	the	experiences	that	are	being	had.	Are	they	visual	or	are	they	tactile	
or	neither?	The	same	considerations	as	were	adduced	for	the	third	theory	would	
carry-over	and	apply	to	this	theory	also.	
Elsewhere,	(Macpherson	2011),	I	have	argued	that	we	do	not	need	to	
choose	between	the	four	theories	of	how	to	individuate	the	senses.	I	believe	that	
people	have	felt	compelled	to	do	so	because	they	subscribe	to	a	sparse	model	of	
the	senses.	That	is	a	model	according	to	which	there	are	relatively	few	types	of	
senses—perhaps	the	Aristotelian	five,	or	perhaps	those	plus	a	few	others—and	
that	those	senses	are	relative	discrete,	that	is,	distinctive	from	each	other.	I	hold	
that	consideration	of	cases	such	as	sensory	substitution,	but	also	cases	of	animal	
senses,	some	of	which	are	to	some	degree	like	ours	and	some	of	which	are	very	
unlike	ours,	and	consideration	of	possible	but	non-actual	senses,	show	that	the	
senses	cannot	be	clearly	divided	up	into	a	limited	number	of	discrete	kinds.	The	
differences	between	the	senses	amounts	more	to	a	difference	of	degree,	rather	
than	a	difference	of	kind.	Rather	than	try	to	pigeonhole	all	the	senses	into	a	small	
number	of	discrete	categories,	we	should	simply	note	what	each	sense	is	like	in	
respect	of	each	of	the	criteria	that	the	four	theories	ask	us	to	consider.	For	each	
of	the	properties	that	these	theories	claim	individuate	the	senses,	we	can	note,	if	
we	like,	how	different	or	similar	each	sense	is	to	one	of	the	five	Aristotelian	
senses	with	respect	to	that	property,	but	that	is	relatively	unimportant.	One	
advantage	of	this	view	is	that	one	does	not	have	to	decide	on	many	factors	that	
were	left	unspecified	by	the	four	theories.	For	example,	one	does	not	need	to	say	
what	an	eye	is,	or	whether	the	camera	or	the	skin	is	the	proximal	stimulus.	One	
does	not	need	to	determine	whether	the	proximal	stimulus	is	light	or	
electromagnetic	waves	more	generally,	or	whether	it	is	pressure	on	the	skin.	One	
simply	needs	to	record	all	the	facts	about	these	features	of	a	sensory	modality	
and	where	one	records	different	facts,	there	one	records	different	types	of	
perceptual	system.	Thus,	on	my	account,	perception	using	TVSS	is	somewhat	like	
normal	human	vision,	somewhat	like	normal	human	touch,	and	somewhat	
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unique,	and	thus	it	should	count	as	its	own	distinctive	sensory	modality—a	TVSS	
modality.	
	
1.4.2	The	Two-	or	Three-Dimension	Issue	
Another	question	that	we	can	raise	about	new	experiences	that	people	might	
have	when	using	sensory	substitution	devices	is	whether	they	represent	two-	or	
three-dimensional	objects	and	space.	In	other	words,	when	people	using	these	
devices	make	depth	judgments	are	they	doing	so	because	they	experience	the	
third	dimension	or	is	it	inferred	from	an	experience	of	two	dimensions?	
An	interesting	source	of	evidence	comes	from	Guarniero,	a	congenitally	
blind	PhD	student	of	Bach-y-Rita,	who	studied	the	TVSS	in	his	doctoral	thesis.	He	
also	used	the	TVSS	for	three	weeks	himself	and	wrote	about	his	experience.	He	
said:	
Very	soon	…	the	sensations	no	longer	felt	as	if	they	were	located	on	my	back	…By	
this	time	objects	had	come	to	have	a	top	and	bottom;	a	right	side	and	a	left;	but	
no	depth—they	existed	in	an	ordered	two-dimensional	space,	the	precise	
location	of	which	has	not	yet	been	determined…	In	order	to	judge	distance	I	had	
to	master	some	of	the	cues	of	monocular	vision,	namely	familiar	size	and	
interposition.	I	also	made	use	of	the	fact	that,	when	things	are	viewed	from	
above,	those	farther	away	appear	higher	in	the	visual	field.	Even	when	
interposition	was	the	only	cue	I	used,	the	objects	still	appeared	two-dimensional	
and	I	had	to	infer	that	one	was	behind	the	other	(1974:101-4).	
This	is	very	clearly	a	report	in	favour	of	the	two-dimensional	view.	
However,	recounting	their	studies	with	the	vOICe,	Ward	and	Meijer	report	
on	two	of	their	subjects:	
Both	CC	and	PF	report	being	able	to	perceive	depth.	However,	both	of	them	
report	that	this	ability	occurred	after	having	‘flat’	visual	experiences	of	edges	and	
shading…	PF	…	reports	her	sense	of	depth	perception	arising	in	a	kind	of	Eureka	
moment:	‘I	was	washing	dishes	…	and	looked	down	into	the	sink	to	make	sure	
that	the	water	had	got	out	and	I	realised	‘‘Oh!	I	can	see	down.	I	can	see	depth.”	
And	I	stepped	back	from	that	sink	and	looked	down	again	to	make	sure	that	I	
wasn’t	fooling	myself,	and	I	walked	slowly	through	my	house	looking	into	the	
rooms	and	it	was	like	incredible.	I	could	see	into	the	room.	That	flat	drawing	now	
has	depth	to	it.	I	can	sense	it’”	(2010:	496).	
PF	was	late	blind	and	had	been	using	the	vOICe	for	four	years,	and	during	two	of	
those	years	she	had	been	using	it	immersively.	
What	these	results	again	point	to	is	that	there	are	probably	a	whole	host	
of	factors	(that	I	outlined	in	section	three)	that	may	affect	subjects’	experience.	
Different	subjects	probably	experience	different	things,	and,	indeed,	the	same	
subject	may	experience	different	things	at	different	times.	Nonetheless,	the	clear	
and	well-documented	reports	of	CC	and	PF,	which	attest	to	gaining	three-
dimensional	perceptual	experience	after	having	had	only	two-dimensional	
perceptual	experience,	is	rather	compelling	evidence	that	three-dimensional	
perception	can	be	experienced.	
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1.4.3	The	Colour	Issue	
What	does	the	evidence	say	about	the	experience	of	colour	in	the	new	
experiences	in	those	who	use	sensory	substitution	devices,	supposing,	as	we	did	
above,	that	they	do	have	new	experiences?	
To	be	clear,	we	have	to	distinguish	between	chromatic	and	achromatic	
colour.	The	achromatic	colours	are	black,	white,	and	all	the	shades	of	grey	in	
between.	The	chromatic	colours	are	all	the	rest,	that	is,	all	the	colours	that	have	
some	hue	value,	such	as	red,	green,	blue,	yellow,	and	so	on.	Do	those	who	use	the	
TVSS	and	the	vOICe	have	chromatic	or	achromatic	colour	experience	or	no	
colour	experience?	Clearly	no	chromatic	colour	information	is	captured	about	
the	world	or	relayed	to	subjects	using	those	devices.	However,	one	might	think	
that	black	and	white	information	is	given	to	TVSS	subjects.	(Recall	that	pins	
either	press	against	the	subjects	or	they	do	not,	with	white	areas	in	the	image	
driving	the	pins	to	vibrate	and	press	against	the	subject	and	black	areas	causing	
the	absence	of	the	pin	press.)	And	one	might	think	that	black	and	white	and	
greyscale	information	is	being	given	to	subjects	who	use	the	vOICe.	(Recall	that	
the	volume	of	the	sound	captured	the	lightness/darkness	dimension	of	the	
components	of	the	image.)	And	one	might	suppose	that	this	means	that	subjects	
using	a	TVSS	will	have	experience	of	black	and	white,	and	subjects	using	the	
vOICe	will	have	experience	of	black	and	white	and	shades	of	grey	in	between.	
However,	that	supposition	is	too	quick.	
Consider	that	one	might	tell	the	subjects	how	the	devices	work,	and	which	
stimuli	correspond	to	white,	black,	and	degrees	of	lightness.	However,	one	
needn’t	do	that.	If	one	did	not	then	subjects	would	not	know	whether	pressure	
corresponds	to	white	or	black	and	whether	increasing	volume	means	increasing	
or	decreasing	lightness.	In	such	a	case,	what	would	subjects’	experience	be	like?	
It	is	wise	here	to	consider	the	early	blind,	the	late	blind,	and	the	sighted	
separately	from	the	congenitally	blind.	One	might	imagine	that	the	early	blind,	
the	late	blind,	and	the	sighted	might	have	experiences	of	black	and	white	and	
lightness	because	their	visual	system	simply	assigns	blackness,	whiteness,	and	
different	degrees	of	lightness	to	the	pressure	or	volume	stimuli,	drawing	on	its	
stored	representations	of	those	colours.	Perhaps	it	would	make	little	practical	
difference	which	way	round	the	visual	system	assigned	those	colours	with	
respect	to	the	ability	of	the	subjects	to	identify	which	objects	were	in	front	of	
them.	After	all,	we	could	have	built	the	devices	differently	so	that	pressure	
signalled	blackness	and	increasing	volume	signalled	increasing	darkness,	rather	
than	the	other	way	around.	Either	way,	subjects	would	have	experiences	of	white	
and	black	and	degrees	of	lightness,	and	whether	they	corresponded	to	the	image	
that	was	driving	the	device,	or	were	inverted	with	respect	to	that	image,	need	
not	concern	us	with	respect	to	the	question	of	whether	achromatic	colour	is	
represented.	
Evidence	for	this	hypothesis	comes	from	Ward	and	Meijer	who	report	PF,	
a	late	blind	subject	with	some	residual	vision,	using	the	vOICe	saying:	
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Just	sound?.	.	.	No,	it	is	by	far	more,	it	is	sight!	There	IS	true	light	perception	
generated	by	The	vOICe.	When	I	am	not	wearing	The	vOICe	the	light	I	perceive	
from	a	small	slit	in	my	left	eye	is	a	grey	fog.	When	wearing	The	vOICe	the	image	
is	light	with	all	the	little	greys	and	blacks.	.	.	The	light	generated	is	very	white	and	
clear	then	it	erodes	down	the	scale	of	color	to	the	dark	black	(2010:	495).	
However,	although	only	achromatic	colour	information	is	delivered	to	subjects,	
this	might	not	limit	the	nature	of	the	experiences	that	subjects	have.	For	example,	
later	in	her	life,	in	a	dialogue	between	PF	and	JW	(one	of	the	experimenters),	PF	
said	that	colors	had	started	to	appear	in	her	experience:	
PF:	…	Over	time	my	brain	seems	to	have	…	used	my	memory	to	color	everything.	
JW:	But	if	you	look	at	someone’s	sweater	or	pants	you	wouldn’t	necessarily	know	
the	color?	It	could	be	blue	or	red.	
PF:	My	brain	would	probably	take	a	guess	at	that	time.	It	would	be	greyish	black.	
Something	I	know	such	as	grass,	tree	bark,	leaves,	my	mind	just	colors	it	in.	
(2010:	497)	
This	suggests	that	the	visual	systems’	of	people	who	have	previously	had	sight,	
can	fill	in	colours—be	they	achromatic	or	chromatic—based	on	the	memory	of	
colours,	or	based	on	pure	guess	work.	If	that	is	right	then	it	is	tempting	to	think	
that	a	congenitally	blind	person,	who	must	lack	such	memories,	would	not	
experience	this.	This	supposition	is	backed	up	to	some	degree	by	a	study	by	
Kupers	et	al.	(2006)	that	found	that	blind	subjects	trained	with	a	TDU	reported	
only	tactile	sensations	on	the	tongue	when	TMS	was	applied	to	their	visual	
cortex,	while	similarly	trained	sighted	subjects	reported	only	phosphenes	(that	is,	
hallucinatory	visual	experiences	of	lights).	This	suggests	that	the	congenitally	
blind	do	not	have	experiences	of	lightness	or	darkness	(nor	of	achromatic	
colour)	when	they	use	the	TDU.	It	does,	however,	raise	an	interesting	question	
about	what	the	experience	of	the	congenitally	blind	is	like	when	they	use	a	
sensory	substitution	device.	Do	they	have	vision-like	experiences	of	objects	at	a	
distance	from	the	body	that	don’t	involve	experience	of	chromatic	or	achromatic	
colour?	
As	mentioned	previously,	Aristotle,	and	almost	all	philosophers	since	then	
have	said	that	there	can	be	no	visual	experience	of	form	without	colour.20	They	
think	that	we	experience	distal	form	in	virtue	of	experiencing	differences	in	
colour.	If	that	is	right	then	there	is	a	worry	that	if	congenitally	blind	people	are	
not	experiencing	colour	then	perhaps	they	are	not	experiencing	distal	form.	
Perhaps	this	would	give	us	a	reason	to	think	that	they	are	merely	judging	what	
the	distal	form	of	the	objects	in	front	of	them	is.	While	it	is	true	that	humans	
typically	experience	distal	form	in	virtue	of	experiencing	differences	in	colour,	
must	it	be	the	case?	Is	another	sort	of	experience	of	distal	form	possible?	
An	interesting	case	to	consider	with	respect	to	this	question	is	bat	echo-
location.	Bats	send	out	a	high	frequency	'chirrup'	sound	and	listen	for	how	long	it	
takes	the	sound	to	return	(if	indeed	it	does)	in	the	form	of	an	echo,	because	it	
bounces	off	objects	in	front	of	them.	This	allows	bats	to	determine	what	objects	
are	in	front	of	them	and	how	far	away	they	are.	It	allows	them	to	negotiate	
																																																								
20	See	Macpherson	(2015:115)	for	further	details.	
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through	their	environment	skillfully	and	quickly,	dodging	obstacles	such	as	tree	
branches,	and	catching	moths	in	the	dark.	Clearly,	using	echo-location,	bats	can	
detect	three-dimensional	objects	at	a	distance	from	their	body.	But	notice	that	in	
so	doing—in	detecting	distal	form—they	don’t	detect	colour.	They	don’t	use	a	
form	of	perception	that	is	able	to	pick	up	information	about	colour.	So	what	is	
the	bats’	experience	like?21	
One	idea	is	that	bats	experience	distal	form	by	experiencing	sound-
reflectance.	If	that	is	right	then	perhaps	one	needn’t	experience	colour	to	
experience	distant	form,	but	perhaps	one	needs	to	detect	some	quality	or	other.	
If	one	must	experience	distal	form	by	experiencing	some	quality	or	other,	what	
quality	do	congenitally	blind	people	using	the	TVSS	or	vOICe	experience?	
One	suggestion	is	that	they	experience	distal	form	in	virtue	of	
experiencing	light	reflectance,	for	that	is	what	drives	the	camera	on	the	TVSS	and	
the	vOICe.	However,	as	stated	before,	subjects’	needn’t	know	whether	a	
substitution	device	signals	white	or	black	with	pressure,	or	increasing	lightness	
or	darkness	with	volume.	But	more	than	that,	they	needn’t	know	what	is	driving	
the	TVSS	at	all.	For	example,	we	could	have	built	a	device	that	was	not	driven	by	
light	reflectance	but	which	was	driven	by	something	else	that	was	capable	of	
informing	subjects	about	what	was	in	front	of	them.	We	could,	for	instance,	have	
built	a	device	that	worked	by	converting	sound	reflectance	information	into	
tactile	or	auditory	stimuli.	Therefore,	based	just	on	the	information	that	they	
receive	through	the	sensory	substitution	device,	it	is	not	clear	how	blind	subjects	
could	be	experiencing	distal	form	in	virtue	of	experiencing	light	reflectance	for	
they,	or	their	brains,	may	have	no	idea	about	what	is	driving	the	system	that	they	
are	interacting	with.	
Are	there	any	other	properties	in	virtue	of	which	the	congenitally	blind	
might	be	experiencing	distal	form?	The	only	other	suggestion	that	I	can	think	of	
is	that	they	are	experiencing	distal	form	in	virtue	of	experiencing	the	pressure	
that	they	feel	on	their	skin	in	the	case	of	the	TVSS	or	in	virtue	of	the	sound	
properties	that	they	hear	in	the	case	of	the	vOICe.	However,	it	is	very	hard	to	
imagine	how	they	can	experience	a	property—form—that	they	experience	as	
being	some	distance	in	front	of	them,	in	virtue	of	experiencing	another	
property—pressure	or	sound—that	they	experience	as	being	on	their	skin	or	
coming	through	headphones.	Of	course,	in	a	causal	sense	of	“in	virtue	of”,	the	
subjects	are	experiencing	distal	form	in	virtue	of	experiencing	the	pressure	on	
their	skin	or	the	sound	from	the	headphones.	But	that	is	not	what	is	at	issue	here.	
Such	a	causal	claim	is	not	disputed	by	anyone	in	these	cases.	What	is	at	issue	is	
whether	the	subjects	experience	the	distal	form	as	being	constituted	by	a	
pressure/nonpressure	boundary	on	their	skin	or	a	sound/non	sound/or	sound	
with	a	different	volume	coming	from	the	headphones.	
To	understand	what	I	mean	here,	consider	a	device	which	was	such	that	
whenever	you	saw	green	triangle,	it	caused	you	to	simultaneously	have	an	
																																																								
21	Of	course	this	question	was	famously	asked	by	Nagel	(1974)	who	thought	that	in	principle	one	
cannot	know	everything	about	what	it	is	like	to	be	a	bat.	However,	even	if	that	were	true,	it	does			
not	stop	one	knowing	many	things	about	what	it	is	like	to	be	a	bat,	as	Akins	(1993)	cleverly	
shows.	
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experience	of	a	purple	square.	In	a	causal	sense	of	“in	virtue	of”,	you	experience	
the	square	in	virtue	of	experiencing	the	green	triangle.	But	in	another	sense	of	
“in	virtue	of”	you	do	not	experience	the	square	in	virtue	of	experiencing	the	
green	triangle.	You	do	not	experience	the	square/nonsquare	boundary	as	being	
constituted	by	the	green/nongreen	boundary,	or	the	triangle/nontriangle	
boundary.	You	experience	the	square	as	being	constituted	by	the	
purple/nonpurple	boundary.	I	call	the	sense	of	“in	virtue	of”	in	which	one	sees	
the	square	in	virtue	of	the	purpleness,	and	not	in	virtue	of	the	greenness	or	the	
triangularity,	the	“phenomenal	sense”	of	in	virtue	of.	I	have	argued	elsewhere	
that	when	one	experiences	one	property	in	virtue	of	experiencing	another	in	the	
phenomenal	sense	then	one	must	experience	those	properties	as	being	at	the	
same	location.22	This	is	not	what	is	experienced	by	congenitally	blind	subjects	
using	the	TVSS	or	the	vOICe.	The	pressure	or	the	sound	is	not	experienced	as	
being	at	the	same	location	as	the	distal	objects.	Therefore,	I	believe	that	they	are	
not	experiencing	the	distal	form	in	virtue	of,	in	the	phenomenal	sense,	the	
pressure	or	the	sound.	Thus,	as	there	are	no	good	candidates	for	being	the	
property	in	virtue	of	which,	in	the	phenomenal	sense,	subjects	experience	the	
distal	form,	I	suggest	that	they	experience	pure	distal	form—that	is	they	
experience	distal	form	without	experiencing	it	in	virtue	of,	in	the	phenomenal	
sense,	any	other	property.	
In	Macpherson	(2015),	I	argue	that	there	are	other	interesting	mental	
phenomena,	unrelated	to	sensory	substitution	that	back	up	the	idea	that	one	
could	experience	distal	form	without	experiencing	it	in	virtue	of,	in	the	
phenomenal	sense,	any	other	property.	Such	cases	include	a	special	case	of	
achromatopsia,	experiences	of	phantom	contours,	experiences	of	amodal	
completion,	and	certain	forms	of	type	two	blindsight.	Spelling	out	the	details	of	
all	of	these	cases	would	take	me	too	far	from	my	present	purposes,	but	the	
interested	reader	can	pursue	my	arguments	in	that	paper.	Moreover,	in	that	
paper,	I	argue	that	even	though	subjects	in	certain	cases	are	not	having	
experiences	of	colour	there	is	reason	to	still	think	that	their	experience	is	
visual—or	at	least	more	like	visual	experience	than	experience	in	any	other	of	
our	sensory	modalities.	This	is	because,	their	experience	is	of	distal	objects,	it	
caused	by	the	proximal	stimulus	of	visible	light,	and	it	is	caused	by	the	operation	
of	the	eyes.	Thus,	unlike	Aristotle	and	many	other	philosophers,	I	don’t	think	that	
visual	experiences	have	to	be	experiences	of	chromatic	or	achromatic	colour.	
However,	as	I	outlined	in	section	4.1,	because	I	hold	a	very	fine-grained	
taxonomy	of	the	senses	that	takes	them	to	differ	in	degree	and	not	kind,	I	think	
that	TVSS	perception	and	vOICe	perception	are	different	from	any	of	our	senses	
and	so	count	as	sui	generis	ways	of	perceiving	the	world,	and	hence	as	being	
senses	distinct	from	vision,	hearing,	or	any	of	the	senses	that	humans	have	
without	technological	intervention.	
However,	in	whichever	modality	one	believes	the	experiences	of	
congenitally	blind	subjects	using	the	TVSS	or	the	vOICe	to	be	in,	I	see	no	good	
reason	to	think	that	the	fact	that	they	do	not	experience	colour	justifies	thinking	
that	they	cannot	be	having	perceptual	experience	at	all	and	must,	instead,	be	
simply	making	judgments	about	the	objects	in	the	world	in	front	of	them.	
																																																								
22	See	Macpherson	(2015).	
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1.5	What	are	the	Limits	of	Sensory	Substitution?	
Thus	far,	I	have	discussed	the	TVSS	and	the	vOICe.	These	are	sensory	
substitution	systems	that	convey	the	shape,	size	and	location	of	objects	in	space.	
There	are	variants	of	these	devices	that	substitute	for	these	properties	too.	I	have	
also	discussed	the	feelSpace	belt—a	device	that	has	been	used	to	try	to	give	
people	a	sense	of	spatial	direction:	magnetic	north.	Other	kinds	of	sensory	
substitution	system	exist	that	I	have	not	yet	mentioned.	One	kind	of	device	tries	
to	substitute	for	the	orientation	of	a	person	with	respect	to	gravity,	in	other	
words	substitute	for	the	vestibular	sense.	Various	forms	of	these	devices	exist.	
Some	exploit	electrical	stimulation	on	the	tongue	as	the	substituting	modality	
(see	Tyler	et	al.	(2003)),	others	exploit	audition	(see	Dozza	et	al.	(2004)),	and	
others	still	vibrotactile	stimulation	on	the	body	(see	Goebel	et	al.	(2009)).	It	is	
interesting	to	note	that	in	all	of	the	devices	just	mentioned,	all	of	the	properties	
that	are	being	substituted	are	“common	sensibles”.	
Aristotle	divided	up	properties	into	proper	sensibles	and	common	
sensibles.	Proper	sensibles	are	properties	that	are	only	detected	through	one	
sensory	modality.	For	example,	Aristotle	thought	colour	is	only	detected	through	
vision	and	so	is	a	proper	sensible	of	vision.	Pressure	is	only	detected	through	
touch	and	so	it	a	proper	sensible	of	that	modality.	Sweetness	is	only	detected	
through	taste	and	so	it	is	a	proper	sensible	of	taste.	In	contrast	to	this,	Aristotle	
thought	that	shape	is	a	common	sensible	as	it	can	be	detected	by	more	than	one	
sense:	both	vision	and	touch.	Size,	position	in	space,	and	direction	are	also	
common	sensibles	for	they	are	all	perceivable	by	more	than	one	sense.	
All	the	properties	that	I	have	so	far	spoken	about	substituting	or	
providing	through	augmentation	are	common	sensibles.	Size,	shape,	and	location	
relative	to	the	body	are	clearly	common	sensibles.	When	it	comes	to	magnetic	
north,	we	don’t	get	the	direction	of	magnetic	north	as	such	given	to	us	through	
any	sense	without	augmentation,	but	all	egocentric	directions	are	available	
through	many	different	senses	to	us,	for	example	through	hearing	and	touch,	and	
many	egocentric	directions	are	available	through	vision.	It	is	easy	to	see	how	one	
could	provide	information	through	each	of	those	modalities	about	which	
direction	was	magnetic	north.	Thus,	all	the	properties	that	we	have	been	
considering	are	properties	that	can	be	detected	by	more	than	one	sensory	
modality.	Given	this,	one	might	wonder	whether	one	can	only	substitute	for,	or	
augment	to	provide,	properties	that	are	common	sensibles.	Or,	in	addition,	can	
one	substitute	for	proper	sensibles	such	as	taste,	smell,	or	pitch	properties?	
When	we	substitute	for	spatial	properties	we	map	each	spatial	dimension	
that	is	being	substituted	onto	a	separate	dimension	created	out	of	a	set	of	
qualities	in	the	substituting	modality.	For	example,	in	TVSS	the	two-dimensional	
camera	image	is	mapped	onto	a	two	dimensional	patch	of	skin.	And	in	the	vOICe	
the	two-dimensional	camera	image	is	mapped	onto	the	dimensions	of	pitch	and	
time	of	occurrence	after	a	click.	In	the	case	of	the	feelSpace	belt	information	
about	the	direction	of	magnetic	north	is	mapped	onto	positions	on	the	belt.	
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One	might	think	therefore	that	to	substitute	for	a	proper	sensible,	such	as	
taste,	one	has	to	create	a	mapping	from	dimensions	of	taste	qualities	to	
dimensions	in	another	modality.	One	problem	with	this	approach	is	that	it	is	not	
clear	whether	each	of	the	sensory	modalities	has	dimensions	along	which	we	can	
plot	each	experience	in	that	modality.	For	example,	Wilson	and	Stevenson	(2006)	
suggest	that,	behind	the	difficulties	of	modeling	olfactory	quality	space,	is	a	false	
assumption	about	olfactory	experience.	This	is	the	assumption	that	olfactory	
experience	is	analytic—that	it	has	various,	basic	distinguishable	components.	
Instead,	they	argue,	olfactory	experience	is	largely	synthetic;	that	is,	the	various	
properties	of	the	odorant	stimulus	produce	a	largely	irreducible	experience.	As	a	
result,	Wilson	and	Stevenson	suggest	abandoning	classification	schemes	that	
attempt	to	model	olfactory	properties	by	means	of	a	quality	space.	If	they	are	
right	then	this	would	present	a	great	problem	for	creating	a	way	of	substituting	
for	the	sense	of	smell.	
Nonetheless,	let’s	focus	on	a	case	in	which	we	think	that	there	are	
dimensions	along	which	one	can	map	the	experiences	in	the	modality.	One	could	
imagine	the	taste	dimensions	consisting	of	degrees	of	intensity	of	the	basic	
tastes:	salty,	sweet,	sour,	bitter,	umami.	And	one	could	imagine	mapping	these	
dimensions	onto	other	sensory	dimensions.	For	example,	a	degree	of	pressure	of	
a	stimulus	on	the	pinky	might	indicate	a	degree	of	saltiness;	a	degree	of	pressure	
on	the	ring	finger	might	indicate	a	degree	of	sweetness,	and	so	on	for	each	finger,	
and	each	dimension	of	taste.	But	if	one	hooked	up	a	subject	to	such	a	substitution	
system	how	would	they	know	which	qualities	the	pressure	on	the	fingers	
referred	to?	If	a	subject	had	never	experienced	those	qualities	before,	how	could	
experiencing	pressure	on	their	fingers	give	them	experiences	as	of	taste	
qualities?23	
When	subjects	use	the	TVSS	and	the	vOICe,	we	tell	them	what	the	tactile	
and	auditory	stimulation	corresponded	to,	namely	shape,	size	and	location	
information,	and	subjects	can	often	find	out	what	it	corresponds	to	by	feeling	the	
objects	in	front	of	them	–	thereby	using	an	existing	sense	to	calibrate	the	
substituted	sense.	Moreover,	subjects	know	what	shape,	size	and	location	are,	for,	
even	if	they	had	never	had	sight,	those	are	properties	that	one	can	come	to	be	
aware	of	through	other	modalities.	
Now	consider	again	the	hypothetical	tactile-taste	substitution	system	that	
I	described	above.	While	we	could	tell	subjects	using	the	system	that	pressure	on	
their	fingers	referred	to	different	levels	of	basic	tastes,	one	might	think	that	
subjects	who	have	never	had	a	taste	sensory	modality	would	not	know	what	the	
basic	tastes	were,	for	they	haven’t	had	any	awareness	of	them.	They	have	only	
had	such	properties	described	to	them,	and	reasonably	we	could	question	
whether	such	descriptions	really	gave	them	knowledge	of	what	such	properties	
																																																								
23	The	astute	reader	will	notice	that	the	same	question	arose	when	I	considered	whether	we	
could	substitute	for	colour—a	property	almost	universally	taken	to	be	a	proper	sensible:	the	
proper	sensible	of	vision.	In	that	case,	I	noted	that	memory	might	provide	one	with	a	means	to	
know	which	property	the	sensory	substitution	device	was	signaling.	It	is	of	some	interest	to	note	
that	on	my	view,	according	to	which	there	is	a	sui	generis	TVSS	modality,	colour	can	no	longer	to	
be	thought	of	as	a	proper	sensible	because	one	can	experience	it	in	the	TVSS	modality	as	well	as	
the	visual	modality.	
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are	really	like.24	So	one	might	have	a	strong	intuition	that	such	a	system	would	
not	cause	experiences	of	taste	in	subjects	using	it.	Rather,	it	seems	more	likely	
that	subjects	would	just	form	judgments	about	what	tastes	were	being	indicated	
to	be	present	by	the	system.	Moreover,	even	if	a	subject	had	taste	memory	and	
taste	imagination,	and	could	come	to	remember	or	imagine	taste	automatically	in	
response	to	the	pressure	on	the	fingers,	an	experience	of	the	memory	or	
imagination	of	taste	would	seem	to	be	a	very	impoverished	experience	compared	
to	really	tasting	things.	It	is	this	fact	that	leads	many	diets	to	come	to	an	end!	
The	intuition	articulated	in	the	last	paragraph	was	that	pressure	on	the	
fingers,	caused	by	a	device	that	could	detect	tastes,	together	with	subjects	being	
told	what	the	pressure	on	their	fingers	referred	to,	would	not	cause	subjects	to	
have	perceptual	experiences	of	taste.	However,	this	view	is	challenged	by	those	
who	hold	the	sensorimotor	theory	of	perception.	Hurley	and	Noe	(2003)	hold	
such	a	view	and	they	claim	that	what	determines	whether	subjects	come	to	have	
experiences	in	the	substituted	modality	depends	on	whether	they	can	acquire	
and	use	the	common	laws	of	sensorimotor	contingency	that	the	substituted	
modality	shares	with	the	perception	that	takes	place	by	means	of	the	sensory	
substitution	device.	(Sensorimotor	laws	are	the	laws	that	describe	how	one’s	
perceptual	experience	changes	in	response	to	the	way	one	acts	on	the	world.)	In	
the	case	of	TVSS	they	think	that	this	would	happen:	
as	you	move	around	an	object,	hidden	portions	of	its	surface	come	into	tactile-
visual	view,	just	as	they	would	if	you	were	seeing	them.	As	you	move	closer	to	an	
object,	its	apparent	tactile-visual	size	increases,	just	as	it	would	if	you	were	
seeing	it.	As	you	turn	to	the	left,	objects	in	“view”	swing	to	the	right	in	your	
tactile-visual	field,	just	as	they	would	if	you	were	seeing	them.	What	it	is	like	to	
see	is	similar	to	what	it	is	like	to	perceive	by	TVSS	because	seeing	and	TVSS-
perception	are	similar	ways	of	exploring	the	environment:	they	are	governed	by	
similar	sensorimotor	constraints,	draw	on	similar	sensorimotor	skills,	and	are	
directed	toward	similar	visual	properties,	including	perspectivally	available	
occlusion	properties	such	as	apparent	size	and	shape.	(Hurley	and	Noe	2003:	
144-145)	
This	is	an	interesting	suggestion	about	when	and	why	one	comes	to	experience	
visual-like	experiences	when	using	a	TVSS.	Suppose	that	it	is	true.	Does	this	
mean	that	one	could	substitute	for	proper	sensibles	such	as	taste	and	smell?	The	
question	will	turn	on	whether	there	could	be	enough	sensorimotor	contingencies	
in	common	between	our	ordinary	perception	of	taste	and	a	sensory	substitution	
system	for	taste,	such	as	the	one	I	have	described.	I	am	not	convinced	that	there	
could	be,	nor	am	I	convinced	that	there	could	be	enough	sensorimotor	
contingencies	in	common	between	ordinary	taste	and	a	sensory	substitution	
system	for	taste	that	would	differentiate	the	sensorimotor	contingencies	from	
those	involved	in	the	detection	of	other	proper	sensibles	such	as	smell.	And	even	
if	that	could	be	guaranteed,	the	question	of	whether	we	should	accept	the	
sensorimotor	theory	of	perception	has	not	been	settled,	and	requires	further	
investigation.	
																																																								
24	See	Jackson	(1986)	for	further	articulation	of	this	point.	
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In	short,	there	are	intuitions	on	both	sides	concerning	whether	sensory	
substitution	or	augmentation	of	proper	sensibles	is	possible.	To	mind	my	there	is	
not	enough	evidence	supporting	the	intuition	that	it	is	possible,	hence,	I	would	
hedge	my	bets	on	the	conclusion	that,	sensory	substitution	or	augmentation	of	
proper	sensibles	is	not	possible.	An	exception	to	this	might	be	cases	where	
memory	is	able	to	give	one	experiences	of	the	properties	that	were	being	
substituted,	but	whether	memory	is	capable	of	producing	the	same	sort	of	
experience	as	perception	is	highly	debatable.	
If	only	the	common	sensibles	can	be	substituted	or	augmented,	at	least	in	
people	who	have	no	memory	of	the	properties	that	we	are	trying	to	substitute,	
then	this	restricts	sensory	substitution	and	augmentation	to,	roughly,	properties	
of	the	shape	and	location	of	objects.	Perhaps	this	makes	the	possibilities	of	the	
types	of	sensory	substitution	and	augmentation	more	limited	than	one	might	
have	hoped	for.	And	perhaps	one	might	feel	rather	disappointed	at	such	a	
conclusion.	However,	knowledge	of	spatial	properties	is	crucial	for	getting	
around	the	world	and	so	they	are	particularly	useful	ones	to	be	able	to	substitute	
in	people	who	lack	them	or	to	augment	in	cases	where	we	wish	to	extend	the	
range	of	our	sensory	powers.	
	
1.6	Sensory	Substitution	and	Theories	of	Perception	
There	are	many	different	theories	of	perception	in	philosophy	and	psychology.	
One	reason	that	theorists	have	been	interested	in	sensory	substitution	is	that	
many	hoped	that	the	results	from	sensory	substitution	experiments	could	be	
used	to	support	certain	theories	at	the	expense	of	rivals,	and	to	provide	
illuminating	examples	of	distinctions	that	some	people	want	to	make	in	
articulating	a	theory	of	perception.	
One	such	case	is	the	sensory-motor	theory	that	I	have	just	discussed	
above.	Hurley	and	Noe	(2003)	claim	that	what	determines	the	conscious	nature	
of	an	experience	is	the	sensory-motor	constraints	that	govern	that	experience.	
Thus	they	claim	that	if	one	uses	a	sensory	substitution	system,	say	one	that	
substitutes	for	vision	using	touch,	then	if	the	experiences	one	has	obey	the	
sensory-motor	constraints	of	vision,	rather	than	touch,	one	will	have	experiences	
with	visual,	and	not	tactile,	phenomenal	character.	And	they	claim,	that	this	is	so,	
even	if	the	part	of	the	brain	that	processes	the	incoming	perceptual	signals	is	the	
tactile	cortex,	rather	than	the	visual	cortex.	The	way	that	they	express	this	last	
point	is	that	in	these	cases	there	is	“cortical	deference”,	rather	than	“cortical	
dominance”.	The	phenomenal	character	of	the	experience	is	not	determined	by	
where	in	the	cortex	the	perceptual	signal	is	processed	or	by	what	phenomenal	
character	activation	of	that	part	of	the	cortex	has	produced	in	the	past.	
Many	factors	make	it	unclear	whether	sensory	substitution	experiments	
support	the	sensory-motor	theory.	Several	of	these	have	been	discussed	above	
about	the	nature	and	limits	of	the	experiences	that	can	be	produced	using	
sensory	substitution.	As	we	have	seen,	the	evidence	about	what	experience	is	
produced	in	which	circumstances	is	extremely	messy.	Different	experiences	are	
produced	in	different	circumstances.	So	the	evidence	does	not	clearly	tell	for	or	
	 28	
against	the	theory.	Second,	the	sensory-motor	contingencies	that	are	produced	
by	sensory	substitution	are,	at	best,	a	sub-set	of	those	produced	by	the	normal	
operation	of	the	substituted	sense,	so	one	would	expect	any	experience	to	be	
only	partially	like	that	produced	normally	in	the	substituted	modality.	Further,	
the	substituting	modality	still	seems	to	be	operative,	and	one	can	attend	to	
experiences	had	in	that	modality,	while	using	sensory	substitution.	So	again,	the	
phenomenal	character	of	the	experience	or	experiences	that	are	had	are	going	to	
be	more	complex	than	those	had	while	using	the	substituted	modality	in	normal	
conditions.	Thus	weighing	up	the	phenomenal	character	of	those	experiences	
and	determining	whether	it	coincides	with	the	relevant	sensory-motor	
contingencies	is	exceptionally	difficult,	and	to	my	mind,	inconclusive.	Finally,	
even	if	we	could	clearly	show	that	sensory	substitution	yields	experiences	that	
are	phenomenally	like	those	had	in	the	substituted	modality,	that	does	not	alone	
show	that	the	sensory-motor	theory	is	correct.	Other	factors	besides	sensory-
motor	contingencies,	could	be	the	cause	of	those	experiences.	For	example,	part	
of	the	within-the-head	functional	role	of	the	experience—specifically	the	effects	
of	the	state	leading	to	the	subject	holding	certain	beliefs	about	the	way	the	world	
is—might	be	responsible.	In	short,	evidence	from	sensory	substitution	does	not	
settle	whether	the	sensory-motor	theory	is	true	or	false.	
Another	debate	about	the	nature	of	perception	that	people	hoped	sensory	
substitution	might	help	to	settle	is	the	debate	about	whether	perception	(broadly	
understood)	involves	two	distinct	elements:	sensation	and	perception	(narrowly	
understood),	and	if	so,	what	the	relationship	is	between	them.	
In	fact,	comprehending	what	this	distinction	amounts	to	is	difficult.	
Contemporary	accounts	of	the	distinction	vary	widely—often	without	the	
explicit	realisation	that	there	is	such	disparity.	Matters	are	not	helped	by	the	fact	
that	many	philosophers	and	psychologists	reject	the	distinction—in	part	because	
the	distinction	is	unclear,	in	part	because	there	are	such	different	
understandings	of	it,	but	most	importantly,	because	many	contemporary	
theorists	think	that	it	is	impossible	to	identify	two	separate	elements	answering	
to	the	descriptions	given	of	them.	Goldstein	and	Brockmole	(2017),	writing	in	
their	classic	text	book,	Sensation	and	Perception,	do	not	use	the	term	“sensation”	
except	in	brief	discussions	of	the	history	of	the	subject,	or	to	explain	why	they	do	
not	use	it!	They	say	that	the	book’s	title	reflects	the	fact	that:	
[s]ensation	was	discussed	in	the	early	history	of	perceptual	psychology,	and	
courses	and	textbooks	followed	suit	including	sensation	in	their	titles.	But	…	
researchers	eventually	stopped	using	the	term	sensation	…	[and]	as	far	as	we	are	
concerned,	everything	that	involves	understanding	how	we	experience	the	
world	through	our	senses	comes	under	the	heading	of	perception.25	
Bearing	in	mind	the	caveats	just	mentioned,	let	me	nonetheless,	attempt	
to	give	an	account	of	the	distinction	between	sensation	and	perception	
(narrowly	understood).	In	the	most	general	of	terms,	sensation	is	most	usually	
taken	to	refer	to	some	basic	element	involved	in	the	use	of	the	senses	or,	
equivalently,	in	perception	(broadly	understood),	while	perception	(narrowly	
understood)	refers	to	a	more	complex	element.	Often	sensation	is	spoken	of	
																																																								
25	Goldstein	and	Brockmole	(2017:	6)	
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occurring	earlier	than	perception	(narrowly	understood),	and	often	it	is	claimed	
that	perception	(narrowly	understood)	is	based	on	sensation,	with	sensation	
coming	earlier	in	a	causal	process	that	leads	to	perception	(narrowly	
understood).	However,	importantly,	that	is	not	always	so.	Thomas	Reid,	who	
gives	an	early	and	very	influential	account	of	sensation,	is	most	often	interpreted	
as	holding	that	sensation	and	perception	involve	parallel	processes	and	that	
perception	is	immediate	and	not	formed	on	the	basis	of	sensation.26	Looking	to	a	
prominent	contemporary	advocate	of	the	distinction,	Nicholas	Humphrey,	is	
quite	explicit	in	holding	a	similar	view.	For	him,	sensation	and	perception	
(narrowly	understood)	are	parallel	processes	and	perception	(narrowly	
understood)	is	not	based	on	sensation.	A	third	account	is	that	sensation	and	
perception	are	held	to	occur	simultaneously	with	sensation	taken	to	be	a	pure	
core	and	hence	a	part	of	perception	(narrowly	understood).	For	example,	
Dretske	(1969:	75,	quoted	in	Ben-Zeev	(1984))	maintains:	“if	one	systematically	
strips	away	from	a	given	perceptual	act	all	the	accretions	due	to	past	experience,	
all	the	collateral	information,	anticipations,	interpretive	and	inferential	elements,	
all	the	habitual	or	conditional	associations,	then	one	will	be	left	with	a	"pure	
sensory	core"—the	given	of	sense	experience.”	Sometimes,	particularly	on	this	
latter	view,	it	is	held	that	we	are	not	normally	aware	of	our	sensations	but	that,	
with	training,	we	can	become	so.27	
What	kind	of	things	are	sensations	and	perception	taken	to	be	and	how	
have	various	people	distinguished	them?	Answers	to	these	questions	give	rise	to	
the	different	accounts	of	the	distinction	between	sensation	and	perception	
(narrowly	understood).	
Philosophers	since	Aristotle’s	time	have	discussed	sensation	and	
perception.28	And	they	have	taken	sensation	to	be	a	conscious	mental	state,	and	
perception	(narrowly	understood)	either	to	be	or	to	(typically)	involve	a	
different	conscious	mental	state—a	perceptual	experience—or	further	elements	
of	a	conscious	state	beyond	that	given	by	sensation	that	together	with	sensation	
form	a	perceptual	experience	(broadly	understood).	In	contrast	to	this,	some	
psychologists	take	sensation	and	perception	(narrowly	understood)	to	be	
different	types	of	physiological	processing.	I	think	that	it	is	important	to	be	very	
clear	which	of	these	one	means	when	talking	about	sensation	and	perception.	
Of	course,	one	might	think	that	physiological	processing	and	mental	states	
will	line	up	nicely,	and	one	might	even	have	hopes	of	one	day	identifying	them.	
With	that	in	mind,	one	might	thereby	attribute	to	the	more	primitive	mental	
states	sometimes	called	“sensations”	some	of	the	properties	that	one	attributes	
to	the	more	primitive	physiological	processing	sometimes	called	“sensations”.	
																																																								
26	There	is	some	dispute	among	scholars	over	this	point	that	is	nicely	summarised	in	Nichols	
(2007,	chapter	5).	Nichols	himself	concludes	that	Reid	does	not	think	sensation	is	required	for	
perception	(narrowly	understood).	Nichols	notes,	as	do	many	other	scholars,	that	Reid	was	the	
first	person	to	make	the	distinction	between	sensation	and	perception	clear.	Hamlyn	(1961),	in	
his	excellent	book	length	account	of	the	history	of	sensation	and	perception	argues	that	Reid	was	
the	first	to	make	it	clear	since	Aristotle.	However,	readers	should	note	that,	as	I	indicated	earlier	
in	the	text,	Reid’s	account	is	far	from	universally	adopted	by	scholars.	
27	See	Clark	(2007).	
28	See	Hamlyn	(1961)	
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And	one	might	thereby	attribute	to	the	more	sophisticated	mental	states	
sometimes	called	“perceptual	experience”	some	of	the	properties	of	the	more	
sophisticated	physiological	processing	sometimes	called	“perception”.	This	is	
precisely	what	Boring	(1942,	chapter	1)	states	happened	in	the	late	nineteenth	
century.	Sensation	and	perception	conceived	of	as	mental	states	by	philosophers	
were	synthesized	with	and	conjoined	to	a	conception	of	sensation	and	
perception	conceived	of	as	physiological	processes	by	psychologists.	This	yielded	
a	conception	of	sensation	and	perception	in	which	sensations	and	perceptions	
were	metal	states	that	corresponded	to	two	different	levels	of	processing.	
However,	it	is	clear	that	such	an	approach	is	controversial.	Whether	such	
identification	can	be	made	is	open	to	debate.	Moreover,	such	identification	will	
not	always	be	feasible,	given	that	some	of	the	accounts	of	the	basic	physiological	
processing	said	to	constitute	sensation	is	so	primitive,	such	as	the	registering	of	
light	on	the	retina,	that	it	would	simply	not	be	plausible	to	identify	it	with	any	
conscious	mental	state.	However,	other	accounts	of	the	properties	of	sensation	,	
considered	as	a	physiological	process,	are	more	amenable	to	identification	with	
conscious	mental	states,	and	one	could	apply	them	to	both	physiological	
processing	and	to	mental	states,	as	we	shall	see.	
One	important	account	of	the	distinction	between	sensation	and	
perception	(narrowly	understood)	is	that	sensation	involves	the	passive	
reception	of	sensory	input	in	the	sense	that	it	is	devoid	of	active	mental	
contributions	such	as	memory,	past	experience,	expectation,	interpretation,	
judgment	and	thought.29	In	the	case	of	physiological	processing,	the	idea	is	that	
when	we	see	an	object,	such	as	a	table—which	is	called	the	“distal	stimulus”—
light	bounces	of	the	table	and	enters	our	eyes.	The	light	is	called	the	“proximal	
stimulus”	as	it	is	that,	rather	than	the	table,	which	has	a	direct	causal	impact	on	
our	body.	The	registering	of	the	light	and	the	turning	of	it	into	an	electrical	signal	
in	the	nerves,	carried	out	by	the	transducers	in	the	eye,	is	a	process	which	some	
claim	is	such	that	the	signal	does	not	“display	any	degree	of	independence	from	
the	[proximal]	stimulus”	(Ben-Zeev	1984:	328).	And	this	process,	together	with	
some	nerve	firings	slightly	further	down	the	causal	chain	that	are	all	also	thought	
not	to	display	any	independence	from	the	proximal	stimulus,	is	sometimes	called	
sensation.30	In	contrast,	perception	(narrowly	understood)	is	a	process	that	uses	
active	mental	contributions	such	as	memory,	past	experience,	expectation,	
interpretation,	judgment	and	thought,	so	as	to	produce	something	that	doesn’t	
just	correspond	with	the	proximal	stimulus—in	our	example,	the	light	that	
impacts	on	the	retina—but,	hopefully,	something	that	corresponds	to	the	distal	
object	that	the	light	bounced	off—the	table.	We	know	that	many	different	distal	
stimuli	are	compatible	with	the	same	proximal	stimulus	and	hence,	if	it	exists,	
the	same	sensation.	On	this	view,	the	role	of	perception	is	therefore	to	recover	
the	most	likely	distal	stimulus	given	the	sensation	and	background	knowledge	
and	assumptions	either	built	into	the	visual	system	and	the	mind	or	learned	by	
them.	
																																																								
29	See	Hamlyn	(1961)	and	Ben-Zeev	(1984).	
30	See	Clark	(2007).	
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One	can	apply	this	sort	of	idea	to	sensation	and	perception	(narrowly	
understood)	conceived	of	as	being	or	involving	conscious	mental	states.	
Sensation	would	be	a	mental	state	that	is	passive	and	devoid	of	active	mental	
contributions	such	as	memory,	past	experience,	expectation,	interpretation,	
judgment	and	thought.	Perception	(narrowly	understood)	would	be,	or	involve,	a	
perceptual	experience	that	was	active	in	the	sense	that	it	did	involve	such	
contribution.	(And	one	may	hold	that	perception	is	in	is	some	sense	based	on	
sensation,	or	one	may	adopt	an	alterative	account	as	detailed	above.)	
Some	people	will	disavow	this	idea	of	sensation,	as	they	may	disavow	the	
idea	that	there	is	any	such	purely	passive	processing	or	mental	states.	However,	
denying	this	need	not	lead	one	to	deny	tout	court	that	there	is	sensation,	because	
this	is	not	the	only	account	of	the	distinction	between	sensation	and	perception.	
One	alternative	idea	is	that	sensation	is	a	feeling	of	what	is	going	on	in	
me—of	how	I	am	being	affected	by	various	stimuli—whereas	perception	is	
consciousness	of	objects	and	properties	external	to	one.	It	is	this	reading	that	
yields	the	conception	of	sensation	as	including	pains,	itches,	and	tickles.	It	is	
associated	with	the	having	of	subjective	feelings	and	affect.	According	to	Hamlyn	
(1961:189),	“while	sensations	may	be	caused	by	stimuli	affecting	our	body,	to	
have	a	sensation	is	not	necessarily,	or	even	generally,	to	know	anything	about	its	
cause.”	In	contrast,	perception	is,	or	involves,	a	mental	state	that	represents	what	
is	happening	in	the	world	around	me.		The	idea	is	that	when	we	perceive	
(broadly	understood),	we	are	aware	of	how	we	are	being	impacted	on	by	the	
world—which	is	to	be	identified	with	sensation—and	we	are	aware	of	what	the	
world	is	like—which	is	to	be	identified	with	perception	(narrowly	understood).	
Humphrey	(1993)	advocates	this	elucidation	of	the	sensation/perception	
distinction	and	endorses	it	as	the	correct	account	of	perception	(broadly	
understood).	
A	third	idea	is	that	sensations	have	no	representational	content—they	
have	no	meaning	or	they	are	not	about	anything.31	Meaning	and	representation	
only	get	a	grip	in	perception	(narrowly	understood).	This	idea	of	the	distinction	
between	sensation	and	perception	(narrowly	understood)	is	that	which	Thomas	
Reid	advocated.	He	claimed,	sensation,	"hath	no	object	distinct	from	the	act	
itself".	In	contrast,	he	held	that	perception	(narrowly	understood)	involved	a	
"conception	or	notion	of	the	object	perceived",	and	a	"strong	and	irreducible	
conviction	and	belief	of	its	present	existence.32		
What	is	the	relationship	between	these	last	two	conceptions	of	the	
distinction	between	sensation	and	perception?	Are	they	distinct?	Yes.	This	is	
because	it	is	possible	to	hold	the	latter	without	the	former.	One	can	hold	the	view	
that	sensations	represent	my	body	and	what	is	happening	to	my	it—for	example	
that	the	skin	on	my	hand	is	being	deformed	or	heated—and	thus	they	are	not	
totally	lacking	a	representational	nature.	
Sometimes	researchers	endorse	one	of	these	three	accounts	of	sensation	
and	perception,	sometimes	they	hold	more	than	one	of	these	to	be	true.	Often	
																																																								
31	See	Ben-Zeeve	(1984)	for	a	summary	of	the	positions	of	those	who	have	held	this	view.	
32Reid	(1785/1941)	Essays	1	&	2,	quoted	in	Hamlyn	(1961)	p.	460.	
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times,	they	are	not	clear	enough	about	which	account	they	hold.	The	keen	reader	
can	find	an	elaboration	on	these	conceptions	of	sensation	and	perception,	and	a	
detailed	account	of	their	historical	development,	in	Hamlyn	(1961)	and	Ben-
Zeeve	(1984).	
How	has	sensory	substitution	been	thought	to	help	in	deciding	whether	
perception	(broadly	understood)	involves	both	sensation	and	perception	
(narrowly	understood)?	Humphrey	(1993)	argues	that	in	normal	vision	we	have	
both	visual	sensations	of	the	light	at	our	eye,	plus	visual	perception	(narrowly	
understood)	of	distal	objects	such	a	tables	and	chairs.	In	TVSS	use,	he	claims	that	
we	have	a	tactile	sensation,	caused	by	the	vibrating	pins	on	our	body	plus	visual	
perception	(narrowly	understood)	of	distal	objects.	This,	he	claims,	shows	us	
that	the	same	visual	perception	(narrowly	understood)	can	be	accompanied	by	
different	sensations,	as	well	as	it	being	the	case,	as	is	widely	agreed,	that,	if	there	
are	sensations,	the	same	sensation	can	be	accompanied	by	different	perceptions	
(narrowly	understood).	Thus,	he	argues	that	sensory	substitution	helps	to	
establish	that	there	are	doubly	dissociable	sensational	and	perceptual	aspects	to	
using	our	senses.	
In	a	similar	vein,	Ned	Block	(1996)	argues	that	sensory	substitution	
supports	the	idea	that	there	is	a	non-representational	element	to	perceptual	
experience—that	he	calls	qualia,	and	that	he	might	easily	have	called	sensation	
given	the	third	definition	of	sensation	articulated	above—that	is	distinct	from	
the	representational	aspects	of	perceptual	experience.	As	we	have	already	
reported,	people	using	TVSS	report	that	they	can	attend	to	the	tactile	stimulation	
on	their	back,	although	they	usually	do	not	do	so;	they	usually	attend	to	the	
objects	apparently	in	front	of	them.	Block	says	that	in	attending	to	the	tactile	
stimulations	the	subjects	are	attending	to	the	sensation	that	accompanies	their	
visual	perception	of	external	objects.	In	like	manner,	he	says	that	during	normal	
perception	people	usually	just	attend	to	the	objects	and	properties	given	to	them	
in	perception,	and	don’t	normally	attend	to	the	non-representational	elements	of	
their	experience—the	qualia	or	sensational	elements—but	he	claims,	it	is	
possible	for	them	to	do	so,	and	that	therefore	they	exist,	with	sensory	
substitution	providing	a	clear	example	of	the	different	introspectible	elements	of	
perception	(broadly	understood).	
Both	of	these	arguments	rely	on	the	thought	that	the	tactile	element	of	
TVSS	use	should	be	considered	as	being	sensation,	in	one	way	or	another,	and	
the	only	sensational	element	occurring	during	the	use	of	the	TVSS,	while	the	
visual	element	should	be	considered	to	be	the	only	perceptual	(narrowly	
understood)	element	occurring	during	it.	However,	these	thoughts	are	highly	
questionable.	One	might	think	that	there	is	both	tactile	and	visual	perception	
taking	place	(which	may	or	may	not	involve	both	sensation	and	perception	
(narrowly	understood).	Why	think	that	the	tactile	element	involves	only	
sensation?	Why	not	think	that	it	involves	both	tactile	sensation	of	how	the	pins	
affect	my	body	and	tactile	perception	of	those	pins,	in	addition	to	the	visual	
perception	taking	place?	Or	why	think	that	the	tactile	element	isn’t	just	
perception	(broadly	construed)	that	is	not	composed	of	sensation	and	
perception	(narrowly	understood)?	Why	think	that	the	visual	element	does	not	
involve	a	sensational	element?	Or	does	not	involve	perception	(broadly	
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understood)	that	is	not	composed	of	sensation	and	perception	(narrowly	
understood)?	Without	answers	to	these	questions—thus	without	independent	
arguments	backing	up	the	existence	of	sensation	and	perception	(narrowly	
understood),	and	how	those	terms	apply	to	what	occurs	in	sensory	
substitution—the	case	of	sensory	substitution	should	do	nothing	to	boost	our	
credence	in	the	existence	of	a	distinction	between	sensation	and	perception	
(narrowly	understood).	The	evidence	from	sensory	substitution	does	not	alone	
provide	evidence	for	the	distinction,	unless	already	seen	through	the	lens	of	a	
theory	that	endorses	those	notions	and	their	appropriate	application	to	the	case	
of	sensory	substitution.	
In	addition,	as	I	have	taken	pains	to	show	earlier	in	this	essay,	it	is	not	
straightforward	at	all	to	conclude	that	there	are	perceptual	visual	experiences	
occurring	in	TVSS	use,	or	experiences	in	the	substituted	modality	in	sensory	
substitution	more	generally.	Indeed,	why	think	that	that	TVSS	involves	either	
tactile	elements	or	visual	elements	at	all?	One	might	argue,	as	I	explored	in	
section	four,	that	its	use	constitutes	a	new	sensory	modality	that	is	neither	tactile	
or	visual.	Or	one	might	hold	that	it	is	purely	tactile,	perceptually	speaking,	and	
only	involves	judgments	that	are	visual-like.	And,	moreover,	what	the	
experiences	involved	are	like	is	a	matter	of	great	dispute	and	may	be	highly	
variable.	Thus,	the	messiness	of	the	evidence	concerning	the	conscious	mental	
states	occurring	in	sensory	substitution	also	foils	its	use	as	a	clear	demonstration	
of	the	existence	and	distinction	between	sensation	and	perception	(narrowly	
understood).	
	
1.7	Practical	Use	
As	we	have	seen	above,	there	appears	to	be	some	potential	for	sensory	
substitution	devices	to	help	those	who	have	lost	a	sense,	and	for	augmentation	
devices	to	provide	us	with	more	information	that	we	already	obtain	through	the	
ordinary	use	of	our	senses.	However,	we	have	also	seen	some	of	the	limitations	
of	these	devices.	Many	substitution	devices	do	not	give	perceptual	experiences	
that	are	identical	to	those	that	are	missing.	They	perhaps	give	aspects	of	those	
experiences,	and	perhaps	only	in	some	people,	and	in	particular	conditions,	and	
perhaps	after	a	great	deal	of	practice	with	the	devices.	Perhaps	in	some	cases	
they	do	not	give	new	experiences	at	all,	only	the	ability	to	make	judgments	about	
the	world.	I	also	noted	that	many	people	who	suffer	from	sensory	loss	(although	
not	all)	do	not	like	using	these	devices	and	do	not	adopt	them	into	their	lives.	
One	reason	that	this	may	be	so	is	a	point	that	one	should	be	clear	about—
clearer	about	than	I	have	been	thus	far.	It	is	that	the	TVSS,	and	the	vOICe,	and	
similar	devices	are	rather	limited	with	respect	to	the	types	of	situation	in	which	
they	work.	Lighting	has	to	be	bright,	and	the	stimului	have	to	be	clearly	
differentiable	from	their	background.	So	test	stimuli	are	often	used	that	consist	
of	very	dark	objects	on	a	white	background	or	vice	versa.	In	other	words,	in	
many	instances	the	devices	only	work	well	in	very	artificial	situations.	Moreover,	
the	resolution	of	the	devices	is	fairly	limited.	The	visual	acuity	of	users	of	a	TVSS	
device	is	very	low.	Sampaio	et	al	(2001)	claim	that	blind	users	averaged	an	acuity	
of	only	40/860	using	it.	In	short,	people	cannot	use	TVSS	and	TDU	devices	in	
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everyday	perceptual	situations	effectively.33	So,	despite	the	high	hopes	that	
Bach-y-Rita	had	in	the	1960s	and	1970s	that	sensory	substitution	devices	would	
transform	the	lives	of	those	who	had	lost	senses,	sensory	substitution	devices	
are	not	in	common	use.	
It	remains	to	be	seen	if	advances	in	technology	will	allow	people	to	make	
more	useful	devices	in	the	future—and	at	an	affordable	price.	What	I	hope	to	
have	shown	in	this	introduction	is	that	if	these	practical	problems	can	be	
overcome—and	that	is	a	big	if—there	is	reason	to	be	hopeful	that	some	people	
may	be	able	to	come	to	have	new	perceptual	experiences	using	these	devices:	
experiences	that	represent	some	features	of	the	world	that	are	of	practical	
importance	to	us.	
	
1.8	The	Papers	in	this	Volume	
The	papers	in	this	volume	represent	the	latest	psychological	and	philosophical	
thinking	about	the	many	different	aspects	of	sensory	substitution	and	
augmentation	that	I	have	discussed	above.	
Renier	gives	a	comprehensive	overview	of	the	nature	of	sensory	
substitution	from	a	psychologist’s	point	of	view,	arguing	that	sensory	
substitution	devices	can	give	people	experiences	in	the	substituted	modality.	
Smith’s	responds	to	Renier,	arguing	that	sensory	substitution	does	not	give	
someone	an	experience	that	has	the	phenomenal	character	of	an	experience	in	
the	substituted	modality.	He	claims	that	the	substituting	modality	takes	on	some	
of	the	functions	of	the	substituted	modality,	making	the	perceptual	experiences	
they	each	produce,	somewhat	more	like	each	other	than	they	would	otherwise	
have	been.	
Corns’	paper	looks	in	detail	at	claims	about	the	perceptual	nature	of	
sensory	substitution.	She	differentiates	the	claims	that	sensory	substitution	
comprises	a	natural	modality,	that	it	comprises	a	unique	modality,	and	that	it	
comprises	a	perceptual	process,	and	she	investigates	closely	the	evidence	for	
each	claim.	
Noordhof	argues	that	in	sensory	substitution	the	substituting	sense	plus	
the	sensory	substitution	device	is	not	always	appropriately	classified	as	the	
substituted	sense.	He	gives	an	alternative	account	according	to	which	properties	
putatively	proprietary	to	a	sense	modality	can	be	presented	in	another	modality	
in	cases	of	substitution.	He	draws	lessons	for	the	development	of	any	kind	of	
representationalist	or	relationalist	theory	of	phenomenal	properties.	
Hillenbrand	et	al.	discuss	the	work	of	Amir	Amedi’s	lab	and	investigate	
the	nature	of	brain	plasticity	and	cross-modal	connections	in	sensory	
substitution,	focusing	on	the	vOICe.	Brown’s	paper	provides	commentary	on	
work	from	Amedi’s	lab.	In	particular	he	discusses	the	idea	that	sensory	
substitution	devices	may	facilitate	behavioural	transference	of	skills	across	sense	
																																																								
33	See	Collins	(1985).	
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modalities	and	that	these	skills	are	therefore	amodally	represented.	He	argues	
that	this	conclusion	is	not	warranted	from	the	evidence	that	the	Amedi	lab	
present.	
Ptito	et	al.	investigate	the	nature	of	brain	plasticity	and	cross-modal	
connections	in	sensory	substitution	focusing	what	occurs	with	us	of	a	TDU.	
The	paper	by	Proulx	et	al.	focuses	on	what	we	can	learn	about	spatial	
navigation	from	sensory	substitution.	This	allows	us	to	compare	sensory	
substitution	systems	for	their	practical	usefulness,	together	with	their	effects	on	
the	brain,	and	their	implications	for	theories	of	cognition	and	cross-modal	
correspondences.	
O’Regan	defends	the	sensorimotor	theory	of	perception	and	its	account	of	
sensory	substitution.	He	argues	that	it	is	not	plasticity	which	gives	rise	to	the	
change	of	experience	observed	after	practice	with	sensory	substitution,	but	
changes	in	the	modes	of	interaction	with	the	world	which	plasticity	allows.	
Briscoe	is	interested	in	whether	active	control	of	the	camera	is	necessary	
for	the	emergence	of	distal	attribution	in	TVSS.	He	thinks	that	it	is	but	he	gives	an	
account	of	this	fact	that	is	at	odds	with	that	given	by	supporters	of	the	
sensorimotor	theory	of	perception.	He	holds	that	the	information	gained	by	
moving	the	camera	helps	to	solve	the	causal	inference	problem	faced	by	subjects’	
perceptual	systems,	namely	the	problem	of	working	out	what	the	most	probable	
source	of	stimulation	in	the	substituting	modality	is.	
Wright	and	Ward	define	a	very	broad	range	of	sensory	tools,	among	
which	sensory	substitution	devices	are	just	one	kind.	They	distinguish	this	group	
of	tools	as	ones	that	provide	‘raw’	sensory	information.	They	differentiate	these	
from	other	sensory	devices	that	operate	at	a	higher	symbolic	or	conceptual	level,	
thus	providing	a	new	taxonomy	of	sensory	tools,	and	a	new	definition	of	sensory	
substitution.	
Cohen’s	paper	also	distinguishes	between	sensory	substitution	devices	
that	provide	‘raw’	sensory	information—the	basic	form	of	energy	to	which	visual	
receptors	are	normally	responsive—and	those	that	provide	information	about	
higher-level	emergent	features	whose	nature	is	not	determined	by	the	basic	form	
of	energy.	He	suggests	that	one	could	build	better	sensory	substitution	devices	
by	building	devices	that	provide	information	about	such	emergent	features,	in	
addition	to	the	basic	forms	of	energy.	Cohen	lays	out	a	programmatic	vision	of	
how	the	design	of	useful	sensory	substitution	devices	should	proceed.	
Connolly	explores	ways	in	which	the	extensive	literature	on	perceptual	
learning	can	be	applied	to	help	improve	sensory	substitution	devices.	He	then	
use	these	findings	to	answer	the	question	of	whether	the	sensory	experience	had	
when	using	sensory	substitution	devices	should	be	classified	in	the	substituted	
modality,	in	the	substituting	modality,	or	in	a	new	sense	modality?	
In	contrast	to	Cohen	and	Connolly,	Spence	lays	out	a	negative	picture	of	
the	prospects	of	sensory	substitution	devices	being	able	help	those	with	sensory	
loss	in	a	practical	manner.	He	sets	out	fundamental	and	technological	limitations	
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of	substitution	devices.	He	also	examines	the	negative	hedonic	tone	that	use	of	
these	devices	frequently	engenders.	
The	paper	by	Suarez	et	al.	picks	up	on	the	theme	established	in	Spence’s	
paper	about	the	lack	of	positive	emotional	experiences	that	users	of	sensory	
substitution	devices	often	report.	Suarez	et	al.	suggest	a	practical	way	of	
overcoming	this	problem.	
Lastly,	Dokic	also	considers	the	emotional	and	hedonic	experiences	
associated	with	sensory	substitution.	He	argues	that	they	are	constituted	by	
noetic	feelings	such	as	familiarity	and	presence.	He	explicates	a	view	according	
to	which	neither	familiarity	nor	presence	can	be	reproduced	in	sensory	
substitution.	However,	he	argues	against	this	view	drawing	on	the	idea	that	such	
feelings	can	arise	at	the	post-perceptual	level,	as	well	as	at	the	perceptual	level.	
He	also	draws	on	the	psychological	literature	on	metacognition,	which	leads	him	
to	a	more	optimistic	view	about	whether	positive	feelings	can	be	enjoyed	by	
trained	users	of	sensory	substitution	devices.	
The	depth	and	breadth	of	these	papers	attests	to	the	enormous	
importance	of	sensory	substitution	and	augmentation	in	thinking	about	the	
nature	of	perception,	perceptual	experience,	and	brain	plasticity	and	
organization,	particularly	cross-modal	plasticity	and	organisation.	It	also	attests	
to	the	interaction	between	perception	and	emotion,	and	the	importance	of	the	
feelings	that	people	have	when	using	sensory	substitution	and	augmentation	
devices.	The	potential	for	these	devices	to	alter	the	skills	and	abilities	that	we	
may	have	through	their	use	is	as	yet	uncertain,	yet	these	papers	push	forward	
our	understanding	of	why	this	is	so.	In	the	end,	our	own	ability	to	affect	our	
perception	through	technology	may	prove	to	be	the	key	to	fully	understanding	
its	nature.	
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